Sunday, March 9, 2014

Buffets mistakes - Things to learn

Biggest Losers
  • Airlines - US air
  • retail stores
  • Paper producer - Champion intl
  • Brokerage - Salomon
Biggest winners
  • consumer franchises
  • newspapers
  • television

Q: I read that when you look at an industry, you look at the most miserable failures of that industry to see whether you will invest in it. Can you talk a bit about that?
Li Lu: It goes back to understanding the business. Once you have that understanding you can extend it to understanding an industry. A certain industry might have characteristics that make it different than others. In certain industries you might have better prospects than others. Find the best of the players in the industry and the worst players. And see how they perform over time. And if the worst players perform reasonably well relative to the great players — that tells you something about the characteristics about the industry. That is not always the case but it is often the case. Certain industries are better than others.
So if you can understand a business inside out you can then eventually extend that to understanding an industry. If you can get that insight, it is enormously beneficial. If you can then concentrate that on a business with superior economics in an industry with superior economics with good management and you get them at the right price — the chances are that you can stay for a very long time.

Bruce Greenwald: Do you want me to give you the answer to that? In the 1960s, their return on capital was 46%. In the 1970s their return on capital was 28%. In the 1980s it was 9% in the 1990s it was 6%. You want to guess how negative it is now?
Li Lu: So that is really fascinating. If you have that data, the amount of insight that would yield would be astonishing. So instead of just accepting the conventional wisdom that the auto business is bad — that is just not true. Or if you say well those guys just unbelievable money machines — that is not true either. So if you can really examine those statistics and understand it that will give you an advantage for analyzing new situations like in China and India. That is really what turns me on. Understanding this gives you a tremendous leg up.

Meeting with Managements
Almost everything we learn is from public documents. I read Jim Clayton's book, for example. There is adequate information out there to evaluate businesses. We do not find it particularly helpful to talk to managements. Often managements want to come to Omaha to talk, and they come up with all sorts of reasons, but what they really hope is that we become interested in their stock. That never works. The numbers tell us a lot more than the managements. We don't give a hoot about anyone's projections. We don't want even want to hear about it.

Saturday, February 22, 2014

Buffett on banks

Lethargy bordering on sloth remains the cornerstone of our investment style: This year we neither bought nor sold a share of five of our six major holdings. The exception was Wells Fargo, a superbly-managed, high-return banking operation in which we increased our ownership to just under 10%, the most we can own without the approval of the Federal Reserve Board. About one-sixth of our position was bought in 1989, the rest in 1990.The banking business is no favorite of ours. When assets are twenty times equity - a common ratio in this industry - mistakes that involve only a small portion of assets can destroy a major portion of equity. And mistakes have been the rule rather than the exception at many major banks. Most have resulted from a managerial failing that we described last year when discussing the "institutional imperative:" the tendency of executives to mindlessly imitate the behavior of their peers, no matter how foolish it may be to do so. In their lending, many bankers played follow-the-leader with lemming-like zeal; now they are experiencing a lemming-like fate.Because leverage of 20:1 magnifies the effects of managerial strengths and weaknesses, we have no interest in purchasing shares of a poorly-managed bank at a "cheap" price. AKA PUBLIC SECTOR BANKS Instead, our only interest is in buying into well- managed banks at fair prices (his definition of fair price is ridiculous for ordinary souls)

He clearly has inclination for consumer oriented banks - no questioning that

With Wells Fargo, we think we have obtained the best managers in the business, Carl Reichardt and Paul Hazen. In many ways the combination of Carl and Paul reminds me of another - Tom Murphy and Dan Burke at Capital Cities/ ABC. First, each pair is stronger than the sum of its parts because each partner understands, trusts and admires the other. Second, both managerial teams pay able people well, but abhor having a bigger head count than is needed. Third, both attack costs as vigorously when profits are at record levels as when they are under pressure. Finally, both stick with what they understand and let their abilities, not their egos, determine what they attempt. (Thomas J. Watson Sr. of IBM followed the same rule: "I'm no
genius," he said. "I'm smart in spots - but I stay around those spots.")

Our purchases of Wells Fargo in 1990 were helped by a chaotic market in bank stocks. The disarray was appropriate: Month by month the foolish loan decisions of once well-regarded banks were put on public display. As one huge loss after another was unveiled - often on the heels of managerial assurances that all was well - investors understandably concluded that no bank's numbers were to be trusted. Aided by their flight from bank stocks, we purchased our 10% interest in Wells Fargo for $290 million, less than five times after-tax earnings, and less than three times pre-tax earnings. WILL HDFC or INDUSIND ever get this cheap? Wells Fargo is big - it has $56 billion in assets - and has been earning more than 20% on equity and 1.25% on assets. Our purchase of one-tenth of the bank may be thought of as roughly equivalent to our buying 100% of a $5 billion bank with identical financial characteristics. But were we to make such a purchase, we would have to pay about twice the $290 million we paid for Wells Fargo. Moreover, that $5 billion bank, commanding a premium price,would present us with another problem: We would not be able to find a Carl Reichardt to run it. In recent years, Wells Fargo executives have been more
avidly recruited than any others in the banking business; no one, however, has been able to hire the dean.

Of course, ownership of a bank - or about any other business - is far from riskless. California banks face the specific risk of a major earthquake, which might wreak enough havoc on borrowers to in turn destroy the banks lending to them. A second risk is systemic - the possibility of a business contraction or financial panic so severe that it would endanger almost every highly-leveraged institution, no matter how intelligently run. Finally, the market's major fear of the moment is that West Coast real estate values will tumble because of overbuilding and deliver huge losses to banks that have financed the expansion. Because it is a leading real estate lender, Wells Fargo is thought to be particularly vulnerable.

None of these eventualities can be ruled out. The probability of the first two occurring, however, is low and even a meaningful drop in real estate values is unlikely to cause major problems for well-managed institutions. Consider some mathematics: Wells Fargo currently earns well over $1 billion pre-tax annually after expensing more than $300 million for loan losses. If 10% of all $48 billion of the bank's loans - not just its real estate loans - were hit by problems in 1991, and these produced losses (including foregone interest) averaging 30% of principal, the company would roughly break even.

Saturday, February 8, 2014

Hiring a Sales guy!

Through the Looking Glass: Hiring Sales People

Perhaps the most common mistake that I see a technical founder make when building her sales organization is she applies strategies that worked in building the engineering team to the sales hiring process. This may sound shocking, but sales people are different than engineers and treating them like engineers does not work well at all.

It starts with the hiring process. If you attempt to hire sales people using the same assumptions that worked with engineering, then here are some of the things that will go wrong:

The Interview

A good engineering interview will include some set of difficult problems to solve. It might even require that the candidate write a short program. In addition, it will test the candidate’s knowledge of the tools she uses in great depth. A small portion of the interview may address personality traits, but smart managers will tolerate a very wide variety of personalities to find the best engineers.

A good sales interview is the opposite. You can quiz them on hard sales problems all day long, but only a horrible sales rep won’t be able to bluff her way through the most intricate quiz on how to sell a complex account. On the other hand, great sales people tend to have very specific personality traits. Specifically, great sales people must be courageous, competitive and hungry. They also need enough intelligence to get the job done. That’s the magic formula. Hire engineers with that profile and you’ll fail. Hire sales people who are really smart problem solvers, but lack courage, hunger and competitiveness, and your company will go out of business.

Dick Harrison, CEO of Parametric Technologies, home of perhaps the greatest enterprise sales force ever built, interviewed Mark Cranney, the greatest sales manager I have ever met, as follows:
Dick: "I'll bet you got into a lot of fights when you were a youth didn't you?"
Mark: "Well yes, Dick, I did get into a few."
Dick: "Well, how'd you do?"
Mark: "Well, I was about 35-1."
Dick: "Tell me about the 1."
Mark tells him the story, which Dick enjoys immensely.
Dick: “Do you think you could kick my ass?”
Mark pauses and asks himself: “Is Dick questioning my courage or my intelligence?” Then replies: “Could or would?”
Dick hires Mark on the spot.

Ask an engineer that same set of questions and at best she’d be confused and at worst she’d be horrified. By asking Mark those questions, Dick quickly found out:
  • If Mark had the courage to stay in the box and not get flustered
  • That Mark came from a rough environment and was plenty hungry
  • That Mark was super competitive, but smart enough to calculate his answer
Hiring sales people is different.

The Background

When screening engineers from other companies, it's smart to value engineers from great companies more than those from mediocre companies. All things being equal, always interview the Google engineer over the Quest Software engineer. Why? Because, as an engineer, you have to be way better to get a job at Google than at Quest. In addition, Google’s engineering environment and techniques are state-of-the-art, so engineers who come from there will be well trained in an environment with high standards.

In contrast, anybody with a pulse can sell a massively winning product like Google Ads or VMware hypervisors, but people who consistently sold Lanier copiers against Xerox were elite. In fact, it might be a good sign that a sales rep was successful at a bad company. To succeed at selling a losing product, you must develop seriously superior sales techniques. In addition, you have to be massively competitive and incredibly hungry to survive in that environment.

The Cost of Making a Mistake

Great engineering organizations strive never to make hiring mistakes as hiring mistakes can be very costly. Not only do you lose the productivity that you might have gained from the hire, but you might well incur severe technical debt. To make matters worse, even when an engineering manager recognizes she’s made a mistake, she’s often slow to correct it, leading to more debt and delay. In addition, building an engineering organization too quickly will cause all kinds of communication issues, which makes slow hiring in engineering a really smart thing to do.

On the other hand, you often can’t afford to build out your sales force too slowly, especially if you have significant competition. Sales people, when compared to engineers, work in relative isolation, so there’s productivity loss, but relatively little long-term debt or fast growth issues. Sales managers generally don’t have issues with firing poor performers, so sales people go fast. I have a friend who was fond of saying, “We have two kinds of sales people: rich and new.”

The Conclusion

Applying engineering hiring techniques to a sales organization is like eating poison ivy to get more green vegetables. You will get the opposite of what you want.

doesn't matter Public or Private Companies - Cash is all!

Capital Market Climate Change

If you run a startup and are currently raising money, you probably planned for a somewhat different fundraising environment than the one you find yourself in today. You probably thought that valuations would be roughly the same as they were the last time you raised money. But they most certainly are not. Perhaps you are caught in the “Series A crunch” or perhaps you are a consumer company and expected that you would be valued on users rather than revenue like the last time. Or maybe you are a lucky enterprise company and are pleasantly surprised—this time.
How could this be? What about the efficient market hypothesis? Aren’t markets rational? Won’t we just return to the “normal” environment that we experienced before? To find out, let’s look at the Price/Earnings (P/E) ratio of all S&P 500 IT companies at various points over the past 18 years. If markets behave rationally, one might expect the ratio of price to earnings to be reasonably stable over the period (click here for complete data set). One would be wrong:

3/31/1995: 21.0
3/29/1996: 22.3
3/31/1997: 23.3
3/31/1998: 30.8
3/31/1999: 49.7
3/31/2000: 73.4
3/30/2001: 26.3
3/29/2002: 82.5
3/31/2003: 44.6
3/31/2004: 31.6
3/31/2005: 22.8
3/31/2006: 22.8
3/30/2007: 22.6
3/31/2008: 19.1
3/31/2009: 14.5
3/31/2010: 18.8
3/31/2011: 15.4
3/30/2012: 15.5

So, the average company on the S&P 500 IT index with $10M in annual earnings would be worth $210M in March of 1995, $820M in March of 2002, $310M in March of 2004 and $155M in March of last year. And those are big companies with real earnings, so you can imagine how a private company’s valuation might fluctuate. If you have no imagination, consider my experience. In June of 2000, I raised money at an $820M post-money valuation. By the end of the year and despite more than doubling bookings, I could not raise money at any price in the private markets and was forced to take the company public at a $560M post-money valuation. Things change.  Why do things change? Because markets are not logical; markets are emotional.

Now that we’ve established that climate change is real, what should you do if the current environment is much worse than you expected?

In some sense, you are like the captain of the Titanic. Had he not had the experience of being a ship captain for 25 years and never hit an iceberg, he would have seen the iceberg. Had you not had the experience of raising your last round so easily, you might have seen this round coming. But now is not the time to worry about that. Now is the time to make sure that your lifeboats are in order.

Before we begin doing that, let’s understand the depth of the problem. First, if you did not understand how radically the fundraising environment might change, then there is no chance that your employees would have understood it. In fact, if you are like most companies, your managers probably implied to your employees that your stock price would only rise as long as you were private. They might have said something ridiculous like: “Based on the current price of the preferred stock, your offer is already worth $5M.” As if the price could never go down. As if the common stock were actually the same as preferred stock. Silly them. As a result, if you raise money at a lower price, your people will likely not only freak out, but possibly believe they were lied to. Note that they may very well have been lied to. As Scooby Doo once said, “Ruh roh.”

Now about those lifeboats.

If you are burning cash and running out of money, you are going to have to swallow your pride, face reality and raise money even if it hurts. Hoping that the fundraising climate will change before you die is a bad strategy because a dwindling cash balance will make it even more difficult to raise money than it already is, so even in a steady climate, your prospects will dim. You need to figure out how to stop the bleeding, as it is too late to prevent it from starting. Eating shit is horrible, but is far better than suicide.

When you go to fundraise, you will need to consider the possibility of a valuation lower than the valuation of your last round, i.e., the dreaded down round. Down rounds are bad and hit founders disproportionately hard, but they are not as bad as bankruptcy.  Smart investors will want the founders and employees to be properly motivated post-financing, so there may be a way to a reasonable outcome for both you and your people. Make sure that you figure out what kind of deal is better than bankruptcy and be sure to communicate to both your existing and potential new investors what you think makes sense. In this situation, it’s better to start low and get one bidder that may lead to many and the market-clearing price than have no bidders and the dream of a high price.

Once you begin your process, keep in mind that you are looking for a market of one. You don’t need every investor to believe that you can succeed. You only need one. If 20 investors tell you “no”, that does not mean that there is no market for your deal. You just need one to say yes and she will erase all 20 no’s.

After, God willing, you successfully raise your round and it’s a down round or a disappointing round, you will need to explain things to your company.  The best thing to do is to tell the truth. Yes, we did a down round. Yes, that kind of sucks. But no, it’s not the end of the world. We can probably re-price your options. If we took too much dilution, we will work with our new investor to make sure that every employee is still highly financially motivated. We are the same company that we were yesterday and if you believed in that company, then you should believe in this one.

If your managers intentionally or accidentally lied, then you will need to address that too. Find out what happened and deal with the damage as best as you can. Do not ignore these things or stick your head in the sand, as you cannot afford to lose any more trust than you have already lost.

If you by some miracle make it through this process, then the most important thing to learn from your experience is this: The only surefire antidote to capital market climate change is positive cash flow. If you generate cash, investors mean nothing. If you do not, then your success will depend upon the kindness of strangers.
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Thursday, February 6, 2014

Monday, January 20, 2014

Understanding Current

Different strokes:
India Essen Welding
& Cutting 2012
Electricity
To explain electricity with a simple
example. Think of electricity as
water flowing through a pipe or
garden hose. The water is really
electrons in the metal that makes up
the wire. The hose is the wire that
transports electricity. Basically,
electricity is created by magnets
spinning inside a whole bunch of
wires. The magnets spinning around
cause electrons to move which
creates electricity.
The three most basic units in
electricity are voltage (V), current (I)
and resistance (r). Voltage is
measured in volts, current is
measured in amps and resistance is
measured in ohms.
Once again using transport of water
to explain the above phenomenon,
the voltage is equivalent to the
water pressure, current is equivalent
to the flow rate and resistance is like
the pipe size.
There is a basic equation in electrical
engineering that states how the
three terms relate. It says that the
current is equal to the voltage
divided by resistance. Further,
kVA = Volts x A
kW = Volts x Amps x Power Factor
or [kVA x Power Factor]
Looking at different electrical
equipment, you will notice that the
power ratings are either expressed 
in kVA or sometimes in kW . To 
understand the difference between 
kw and kva - KW is called actual or 
real power, or simply the amount of 
power that is available to do real 
work. On the other hand kVA is 
known as “apparent” power.

Monday, January 13, 2014

Everything Store: Questions on Flipkart!

Unlike traditional retailers, Amazon boasted what was called a negative operating cycle. Customers paid with their credit cards when their books shipped but Amazon settled its accounts with the book distributors only every few months. With every sale, Amazon put more cash in the bank, giving it a steady stream of capital to fund its operations and expansion.14 The company could also lay claim to a uniquely high return on invested capital. Unlike brick-and-mortar retailers, whose inventories were spread out across hundreds or thousands of stores around the country, Amazon had one website and, at that time, a single warehouse and inventory. Amazon’s ratio of fixed costs to revenue was considerably more favorable than that of its offline competitors. In other words, Bezos and Covey argued, a dollar that was plugged into Amazon’s infrastructure could lead to exponentially greater returns than a dollar that went into the infrastructure of any other retailer in the world.

Not sure FK qualifies on any of the counts above 1) negative op cycle or positive float business 2) consolidated warehouses (probably yes) and 3) return on $ of infra far higher for the company!

Look, you should wake up worried, terrified every morning,” he told his employees. “But don’t be worried about our competitors because they’re never going to send us any money anyway. Let’s be worried about our customers and stay heads-down focused.

Nice!

Clock of the Long Now, an aspirational project aimed at building a massive mechanical clock designed to measure time for ten thousand years, a way to promote long-term thinking

Theoretical response:

You seem like a really nice guy, so don’t take this the wrong way, but you really need to sell to Barnes and Noble and get out now,” one student bluntly informed Bezos.

“Amazon had to be focused on its own business,” says Tinsley. “Our biggest mistake was thinking we had the bandwidth to work with all these companies.”

Could a Wal-Mart-type story still occur in this day and age? My answer is of course it could happen again. Somewhere out there right now there’s someone—probably hundreds of thousands of someones—with good enough ideas to go all the way. It will be done again, over and over, providing that someone wants it badly enough to do what it takes to get there. It’s all a matter of attitude and the capacity to constantly study and question the management of the business.

Toys are so fad driven, it’s a little like betting on Oscar winners only by looking at movie trailers,” Miller says.

customer obsession, frugality, bias for action, ownership, and high bar for talent. Later Amazon would add a sixth value, innovation.

“The membership fee is a onetime pain, but it’s reinforced every time customers walk in and see forty-seven-inch televisions that are two hundred dollars less than anyplace else,” Sinegal said. “It reinforces the value of the concept. Customers know they will find really cheap stuff at Costco.”10

At a two-day management and board offsite later that year, Amazon invited business thinker Jim Collins to present the findings from his soon-to-be-published book Good to Great. Collins had studied the company and led a series of intense discussions at the offsite. “You’ve got to decide what you’re great at,” he told the Amazon executives.

Bezos announced that employees could no longer use such corporate crutches and would have to write their presentations in prose, in what he called narratives

a six-page limit on narratives, with additional room for footnotes.
The goal was to get employees to distill a pitch into its purest essence, to start from something the customer might see—the public announcement—and work backward. Bezos didn’t believe anyone could make a good decision about a feature or a product without knowing precisely how it would be communicated to the world—and what the hallowed customer would make of it.

This is excellent!

The jewelry industry had a simplistic pricing model with generous margins. Retail markup was significant; stores doubled the wholesale cost (a practice known as keystone pricing) or even tripled it (known as triple-keystone pricing). Jewelry manufacturers and retailers clung tightly to that custom, which didn’t fit well with Bezos’s newly adamant resolve to offer the lowest prices anywhere.




Sunday, December 29, 2013

Einstein Biography


Imagination is more important than knowledge

In teaching history,” he replied, “there should be extensive discussion of personalities who benefited mankind through independence of character and judgment

tolerance not simply as a sweet virtue but as a necessary condition for a creative society. “It is important to foster individuality,” he said, “for only the individual can produce the new ideas.

the classical concept of the field the greatest contribution to the scientific spirit.

I believe that love is a better teacher than a sense of duty

Music, Nature, and God became intermingled in him in a complex of feeling, a moral unity, the trace of which never vanished

Throughout his life, Albert Einstein would retain the intuition and the awe of a child. He never lost his sense of wonder at the magic of nature’s phenomena—magnetic fields, gravity, inertia, acceleration, light beams—which grown-ups find so commonplace. He retained the ability to hold two thoughts in his mind simultaneously, to be puzzled when they conflicted, and to marvel when he could smell an underlying unity. “People like you and me never grow old,” he wrote a friend later in life. “We never cease to stand like curious children before the great mystery into which we were born.”

Despite his parents’ secularism, or perhaps because of it, Einstein rather suddenly developed a passionate zeal for Judaism. “He was so fervent in his feelings that, on his own, he observed Jewish religious strictures in every detail,” his sister recalled. He ate no pork, kept kosher dietary laws, and obeyed the strictures of the Sabbath, all rather difficult to do when the rest of his family had a lack of interest bordering on disdain for such displays. He even composed his own hymns for the glorification of God, which he sang to himself as he walked home from school.

Out yonder there was this huge world, which exists independently of us human beings and which stands before us like a great, eternal riddle

The religious inclination lies in the dim consciousness that dwells in humans that all nature, including the humans in it, is in no way an accidental game, but a work of lawfulness, that there is a fundamental cause of all existence.”

“The military tone of the school, the systematic training in the worship of authority that was supposed to accustom pupils at an early age to military discipline, was particularly unpleasant

With his love of the sublime solitude found in the mountains, Einstein hiked for days in the Alps and Apennines, including an excursion from Pavia to Genoa to see his mother’s brother Julius Koch

With his love of the sublime solitude found in the mountains, Einstein hiked for days in the Alps and Apennines, including an excursion from Pavia to Genoa to see his mother’s brother Julius Koch

The teaching was based on the philosophy of a Swiss educational reformer of the early nineteenth century, Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi, who believed in encouraging students to visualize images. He also thought it important to nurture the “inner dignity” and individuality of each child. Students should be allowed to reach their own conclusions, Pestalozzi preached, by using a series of steps that began with hands-on observations and then proceeded to intuitions, conceptual thinking, and visual imagery.

Visual understanding is the essential and only true means of teaching how to judge things correctly

If a person could run after a light wave with the same speed as light, you would have a wave arrangement which could be completely independent of time. Of course, such a thing is impossible



Wednesday, December 25, 2013

eosop fable and businesses

“A Doe who had had the misfortune to lose the sight of one of her eyes, and so could not see anyone approaching on that side, made it her practice to graze on a high cliff near the sea. Thus she kept her good eye toward the land on the lookout for hunters, while her blind side was toward the sea whence she feared no danger. But one day some sailors were rowing past in a boat. Catching sight of the doe as she was grazing peacefully along the edge of the cliff, one of the sailors drew his bow and shot her. With her last gasp the dying doe said: "Alas, ill-fated creature that I am! I was safe on the land side, whence I looked for danger, but my enemy came from the sea, to which I looked for protection.”

Montaigne said: “Death can surprise us in so many ways.” For example, recurring revenue streams may stop or long-term customers may disappear. Remember what has happened to newspapers. As Alice Schroeder wrote on Buffett inThe Snowball: “He tended to extrapolate mathematical probabilities over time to the inevitable (and often correct) conclusion that if something can go wrong it eventually will."

Monday, December 2, 2013

Start up - Key lessons

February 2009

One of the things I always tell startups is a principle I learned from Paul Buchheit: it's better to make a few people really happy than to make a lot of people semi-happy. I was saying recently to a reporter that if I could only tell startups 10 things, this would be one of them. Then I thought: what would the other 9 be?

When I made the list there turned out to be 13:
1. Pick good cofounders.

Cofounders are for a startup what location is for real estate. You can change anything about a house except where it is. In a startup you can change your idea easily, but changing your cofounders is hard. [1] And the success of a startup is almost always a function of its founders.

2. Launch fast.

The reason to launch fast is not so much that it's critical to get your product to market early, but that you haven't really started working on it till you've launched. Launching teaches you what you should have been building. Till you know that you're wasting your time. So the main value of whatever you launch with is as a pretext for engaging users.

3. Let your idea evolve.

This is the second half of launching fast. Launch fast and iterate. It's a big mistake to treat a startup as if it were merely a matter of implementing some brilliant initial idea. As in an essay, most of the ideas appear in the implementing.

4. Understand your users.

You can envision the wealth created by a startup as a rectangle, where one side is the number of users and the other is how much you improve their lives. [2] The second dimension is the one you have most control over. And indeed, the growth in the first will be driven by how well you do in the second. As in science, the hard part is not answering questions but asking them: the hard part is seeing something new that users lack. The better you understand them the better the odds of doing that. That's why so many successful startups make something the founders needed.

5. Better to make a few users love you than a lot ambivalent.

Ideally you want to make large numbers of users love you, but you can't expect to hit that right away. Initially you have to choose between satisfying all the needs of a subset of potential users, or satisfying a subset of the needs of all potential users. Take the first. It's easier to expand userwise than satisfactionwise. And perhaps more importantly, it's harder to lie to yourself. If you think you're 85% of the way to a great product, how do you know it's not 70%? Or 10%? Whereas it's easy to know how many users you have.

6. Offer surprisingly good customer service.

Customers are used to being maltreated. Most of the companies they deal with are quasi-monopolies that get away with atrocious customer service. Your own ideas about what's possible have been unconsciously lowered by such experiences. Try making your customer service not merely good, but surprisingly good. Go out of your way to make people happy. They'll be overwhelmed; you'll see. In the earliest stages of a startup, it pays to offer customer service on a level that wouldn't scale, because it's a way of learning about your users.

7. You make what you measure.

I learned this one from Joe Kraus. [3] Merely measuring something has an uncanny tendency to improve it. If you want to make your user numbers go up, put a big piece of paper on your wall and every day plot the number of users. You'll be delighted when it goes up and disappointed when it goes down. Pretty soon you'll start noticing what makes the number go up, and you'll start to do more of that. Corollary: be careful what you measure.

8. Spend little.

I can't emphasize enough how important it is for a startup to be cheap. Most startups fail before they make something people want, and the most common form of failure is running out of money. So being cheap is (almost) interchangeable with iterating rapidly. [4]But it's more than that. A culture of cheapness keeps companies young in something like the way exercise keeps people young.

9. Get ramen profitable.

"Ramen profitable" means a startup makes just enough to pay the founders' living expenses. It's not rapid prototyping for business models (though it can be), but more a way of hacking the investment process. Once you cross over into ramen profitable, it completely changes your relationship with investors. It's also great for morale.

10. Avoid distractions.

Nothing kills startups like distractions. The worst type are those that pay money: day jobs, consulting, profitable side-projects. The startup may have more long-term potential, but you'll always interrupt working on it to answer calls from people paying you now. Paradoxically, fundraising is this type of distraction, so try to minimize that too.

11. Don't get demoralized.

Though the immediate cause of death in a startup tends to be running out of money, the underlying cause is usually lack of focus. Either the company is run by stupid people (which can't be fixed with advice) or the people are smart but got demoralized. Starting a startup is a huge moral weight. Understand this and make a conscious effort not to be ground down by it, just as you'd be careful to bend at the knees when picking up a heavy box.

12. Don't give up.

Even if you get demoralized, don't give up. You can get surprisingly far by just not giving up. This isn't true in all fields. There are a lot of people who couldn't become good mathematicians no matter how long they persisted. But startups aren't like that. Sheer effort is usually enough, so long as you keep morphing your idea.

13. Deals fall through.

One of the most useful skills we learned from Viaweb was not getting our hopes up. We probably had 20 deals of various types fall through. After the first 10 or so we learned to treat deals as background processes that we should ignore till they terminated. It's very dangerous to morale to start to depend on deals closing, not just because they so often don't, but because it makes them less likely to.

Having gotten it down to 13 sentences, I asked myself which I'd choose if I could only keep one.

Understand your users. That's the key. The essential task in a startup is to create wealth; the dimension of wealth you have most control over is how much you improve users' lives; and the hardest part of that is knowing what to make for them. Once you know what to make, it's mere effort to make it, and most decent hackers are capable of that.

Understanding your users is part of half the principles in this list. That's the reason to launch early, to understand your users. Evolving your idea is the embodiment of understanding your users. Understanding your users well will tend to push you toward making something that makes a few people deeply happy. The most important reason for having surprisingly good customer service is that it helps you understand your users. And understanding your users will even ensure your morale, because when everything else is collapsing around you, having just ten users who love you will keep you going.





Notes

[1] Strictly speaking it's impossible without a time machine.

[2] In practice it's more like a ragged comb.

[3] Joe thinks one of the founders of Hewlett Packard said it first, but he doesn't remember which.

[4] They'd be interchangeable if markets stood still. Since they don't, working twice as fast is better than having twice as much time.