Monday, August 25, 2014

Ontology


  • He is all-encompassing
  • He encompasses the current thought that He is all-encompassing
  • This thought could be considered real or unreal
  • If the thought belongs to the real world, He exists in reality
  • If the thought belongs to the unreal world, He must exist in the world outside this unreal world i.e. encompassing the real world given that He is all-encompassing => He exists in reality
  • Ergo He exists!

Godel's Proof:

 Let us call it the argument from omniscience.

  • God is understood to be an individual or being who knows everything, i.e., is omniscient. If something is true, God (real or fictitious) would know it. Similarly, if something is false, God (real or fictitious) would know that as well. Along with this goes the fact that we conceive of God as encompassing all rationality. A being who created the universe but was irrational, for example, would not appropriately be called God.
  • All rational individuals believe in their own existence. Even if they don't exist, this is presumed to be the case. Popeye is conceived of as believing in his own existence. He is simply mistaken about this fact. Existing individuals believe correctly in their own existence, while fictitious individuals are sadly mistaken on this point.
  • If God did not exist, then by our first point, above, God would know that he or she did not exist. But this contradicts our second point. So God must exist.

Sunday, August 24, 2014

Better - Key Takeaways

The first is diligence, the necessity of giving sufficient attention to detail to avoid error and prevail against obstacles. Diligence seems an easy and minor virtue. (You just pay attention, right?) But it is neither. Diligence is both central to performance and fiendishly hard

The second challenge is to do right. Medicine is a fundamentally human profession. It is therefore forever troubled by human failings, failings like avarice, arrogance, insecurity, misunderstanding.

The third requirement for success is ingenuity--thinking anew. Ingenuity is often misunderstood. It is not a matter of superior intelligence but of character. It demands more than anything a willingness to recognize failure, to not paper over the cracks, and to change. It arises from deliberate, even obsessive, reflection on failure and a constant searching for new solutions


Wednesday, August 20, 2014

The mystery of high stock market valuations!

The United States stock market looks very expensive right now. The CAPE ratio, a stock-price measure I helped develop — is hovering at a worrisome level.

I wrote with some concern about the high ratio in this space a little over a year ago, when it stood at around 23, far above its 20th-century average of 15.21. (CAPE stands for cyclically adjusted price-earnings.) Now it is above 25, a level that has been surpassed since 1881 in only three previous periods: the years clustered around 1929, 1999 and 2007. Major market drops followed those peaks.

The CAPE was never intended to indicate exactly when to buy and to sell. The market could remain at these valuations for years. But we should recognize that we are in an unusual period, and that it's time to ask some serious questions about it.

My colleague John Y. Campbell, now at Harvard, and I created the ratio more than 25 years ago. It works like this: Using inflation-adjusted figures, we divide stock prices by corporate earnings averaged over the preceding 10 years. Our ratio differs from a conventional price-to-earnings ratio in that it uses 10 years, rather than one year, in the denominator. It does so to help minimize effects of business-cycle fluctuations, and it's helpful in comparing valuations over long horizons.

In the last century, the CAPE has fluctuated greatly, yet it has consistently reverted to its historical mean — sometimes taking a while to do so. Periods of high valuation have tended to be followed eventually by stock-price declines.

Still, the ratio has been a very imprecise timing indicator: It's been relatively high — above 20 — for almost all the last 20 years, with the exception of 20 months, mostly in the recession of 2007-9, when prices tumbled and it fell as low as 13.32.

In other words, the ratio is saying the stock market has been relatively expensive for years. And that raises a question: Are there legitimate factors behind high stock prices that might keep them elevated for decades more?

Such a question has been addressed before. In 1930, just after the 1929 crash, Prof. Irving Fisher of Yale published "The Stock Market Crash — and After." The book explained why there were "sound reasons" for the high valuations of 1929. He couldn't have been more wrong.

To understand valuations, I have conductedquestionnaire surveys of individual and institutional investors since 1989, recently under the auspices of the Yale School of Management. One question, asking if stocks are overvalued, undervalued or valued about right, is used to create a valuation confidence index. When the CAPE ratio reached its record high of 44 in 2000, the confidence index hit a record low.

But as the market fell from its 2000 peak, the confidence index rose to high levels again, where it remained until recently. This year, the index took a dive for individual investors, and now is at the lowest level since 2000. The confidence of professional investors has fallen, too, but not as sharply. In short, people are beginning to worry.

Yet valuations remain high, and it would be comforting if they made sense. So I've been trying to come up with a theory to explain today's elevated stock prices — and maybe convince myself that they could remain lofty for some time. One factor to consider is that bond prices are high, too.

Inflation is running at only around 2 percent, and 10-year Treasury notes yield less than 2.5 percent, a very low level. Bond prices move in the opposite direction as interest rates, and high bond prices may account for the high valuations in stocks.

The inverse was certainly true in the late 1970s and early '80s, when inflation and Treasury yields were in the double digits. Back in 1979, Franco Modigliani of M.I.T. and Richard A. Cohn of the University of Hartford argued that investors were then undervaluing the stock market, because they failed to perceive that despite high inflation, real interest rates were relatively modest. The two men rightly predicted that there would be a stock market boom if inflation fell significantly — as we now know it began to do within a year after they made their case.

It's possible that bond prices account for today's stock market valuations. But that raises another question: Why are bond prices so high? There are short-term explanations: the role of central banks, for example. But is there a compelling reason for prices of stocks and bonds (and maybe houses, too) to remain high indefinitely?

I've looked for untraditional answers. Perhaps today's prices have something to do with anxiety about the future. I suspect that after the financial crisis, working people are much more worried about their future pay. Many are concerned that they might lose their jobs to cost-cutting, or that they might eventually be replaced by a computer or robot or website. Such anxiety might push them to try to make up for these potential shortfalls by investing in stocks and bonds — even if they worry that these assets are overvalued.

Extrapolating from a theory of Robert E. Lucas Jr. of the University of Chicago, one might well expect lofty stock prices amid such worries: When there aren't enough good investing opportunities, people wishing to save more for the future may succeed only in bidding up existing assets even if they think they're overpriced. Call it the "life preserver on the Titanic" theory.

This explanation, though, is probably not the whole story. The problem, as shown in my work with Sanford Grossman, founder of QFS Asset Management, and inwork by Lars Peter Hansen of the University of Chicago and Kenneth Singleton of Stanford, is that the market just moves up and down more than Professor Lucas's theory would suggest.

So nothing I've come up with is a slam-dunk explanation for the continuing high level of valuations. I suspect that the real answers lie largely in the realm of sociology and social psychology — in phenomena like irrational exuberance, which, eventually, has always faded before. If the mood changes again, stock market investments may disappoint us.


Sent from my iPad

Berkshire corrections

Sunday, August 17, 2014

Understanding Porter - Joan Magretta

Interesting insights:

“The essence of strategy,” Porter often says, “is choosing what not to do.”

Avoid head on competition by developing niches - there is a place for everyone if only they focus on the right customer segment eg. McDonald’s is a winner in fast food, specifically fast burgers. But In-N-Out Burger thrives on slow burgers. Its customers are happy to wait ten minutes or more (an eternity by McDonald’s stopwatch) to get nonprocessed, fresh burgers cooked to order on homemade buns. 

Either be number 1 or number 2 in your industry, or get out. That ultimatum was made famous by former GE CEO Jack Welch, but it is just one version of what is arguably the most influential form of competition to be the best. For investors, it may well make sense to invest only in the top 2 or 3 leaders in a segment

Economies of scale are often exhausted once an industry leader captures 10% market share (don't know if there are enough examples out there to prove this). It is a bit counter-intuitive that size does not imply scale economies, may be size is a necessary but not sufficient condition for scale economies. Eg. GM vs BMW, GM went into bankruptcy while BMW, small by industry standards, has a history of superior returns. Over the past decade (2000–2009), its average return on invested capital was 50 percent higher than the industry average. In the Indian context, Leyland vs Eicher Motors could provide similar basis

Industry structure is surprisingly sticky, i.e High RoIC industries remain that way for a long time.Despite the prevailing sense that business changes with incredible rapidity, Porter discovered that industry structure—once an industry passes beyond its emerging, prestructure phase—tends to be quite stable over time. New products come and go. New technologies come and go. Things change all the time. But structural change—and therefore change in the average profitability of an industry—usually takes a long time.Not sure if this is applicable to technology companies which are rapidly evolving eg. twitter etc.

Doctors and airline pilots as suppliers have historically exercised tremendous bargaining power because their skills have been both essential and in short supply. China produces 95 percent of the world’s supply of neodymium, a rare earth metal needed by Toyota and other automakers for electric motors. Neodymium prices quadrupled in just one year (2010), as the Chinese restricted supply. Toyota is working hard to develop a new motor that will end its dependence on rare earth metals. Guar production in Rajasthan for usage in fracking may exhibit similar characteristics



The ability to command a higher price is the essence of differentiation, a term Porter uses in this somewhat idiosyncratic way.

Typically, the culture of low cost permeates the entire company, as it does with companies as diverse as Vanguard (financial services), IKEA (home furnishings), Teva (generic drugs), Walmart (discount retailing), and Nucor (steel manufacture). You can look at the executive dining room and judge the cost structure of several companies!

Investment implications: Invest in industries which have above average RoICs and within industries, invest in companies with above average industry RoIC

Low cost differentiators: Charles Schwab created a new category known as discount brokerage—around a different value chain. Not all customers want advice, so why should they have to pay for it? Take away all the activities needed to give advice, focus instead on executing trades, and you can create a different kind of value: low-cost trades that make stock ownership accessible to a wider customer base. Matching the value chain—the activities performed inside the company—to the customer’s definition of value was a new way of thinking just twenty-five years ago. Today it has become conventional wisdom. Zerodha in India is a pioneer in doing this - leveraging technology to provide low cost broking.

 Substitution:Natural cork stoppers contaminating the natural frangrance produced by wine bottles created an opportunity for plastics makers such as Nomacorc to step into the breech. Nomacorc’s value chain made it relatively easy for it to undertake research into the chemistry of wine taint, and to solve the problem.  By 2009, Nomacorc’s automated North Carolina factory was churning out close to 160 million plastic stoppers a month, and synthetic corks had captured 20 percent of the market

Niches:For 30 years, Edward Jones focused on customers defined not by how much money they have, but on their attitude toward investing. Jones serves conservative investors who delegate financial decisions to a trusted advisor

Trust is built through personal, face-to-face relationships. To that end, Jones invests in conveniently located offices, and lots of them—in small towns, suburbs, and strip malls. Each office has just one financial advisor, a model unique in the industry. Jones prefers to hire from outside the industry, looking for advisors with both community and entrepreneurial spirit. It spends heavily on training new hires in its conservative product line (mostly blue-chip investments) and its buy-and-hold philosophy

It lays out what Edward Jones does not do: It doesn’t serve high rollers and day traders. It doesn’t sell derivatives, commodities, or penny stocks. It doesn’t offer online trading because that “encourages rash decision making.” It tells prospective clients it wants investors, not gamblers. Trade-offs like these are never easy. 

Oblique competition:The Enterprise value proposition is based on a simple insight: renting a car meets different needs at different times. Hertz and its followers in the industry built their business around travelers, people away from home on business or on vacation. Enterprise recognized that a sizeable minority of rentals, roughly 40 to 45 percent, occur in the renter’s home city. If your car is stolen, for example, or damaged in an accident, you’ll need a rental. In such cases, your insurance company might cover the cost, usually with contractual limits on the price it will pay. About a third of Enterprise’s revenues come from insurers. Other occasions prompt home-city rentals as well—for example, when a car has a mechanical failure or when a child is home from school on vacation. In all of these uses, home-city car renters tend to be more price sensitive than business or vacation travelers.

Enterprise crafted a unique value proposition to meet these needs: reasonably priced, convenient, home-city rentals. Compared with Hertz and Avis, Enterprise has chosen to serve a different need at a different relative price. It is not that Enterprise is the best car rental company. Nor is the market it serves inherently better. But starting with the specific need it serves, Enterprise has made a different choice about the value proposition triangle. Enterprise’s customer base would confound traditional market segmentation by demographic characteristics.

Key learings:
- Best measure of superior long term returns is RoIC
- Competitive advantage means a company can sustain higher relative prices or lower relative costs

Saturday, August 16, 2014

Bubbles, Bubbles Everywhere - Source: Mauldin Economics


The difference between genius and stupidity is that genius has its limits.
– Albert Einstein
Genius is a rising stock market.
– John Kenneth Galbraith
Any plan conceived in moderation must fail when circumstances are set in extremes.
– Prince Metternich
I'm forever blowing bubbles, Pretty bubbles in the air
They fly so high, nearly reach the sky, Then like my dreams they fade and die
Fortune's always hiding, I've looked everywhere
I'm forever blowing bubbles, Pretty bubbles in the air







Humans Never Learn
Financial bubbles happen frequently. In the 1970s, gold went from $35 to $850 before crashing. In the 1980s, the Japanese Nikkei went from 8,000 to 40,000 before losing 80 percent of its value. In the 1990s, the Nasdaq experienced the dot-com bubble and stocks went from 440 to 5,000 before crashing spectacularly in 2000. The Nasdaq lost 80 percent of its value in less than two years. Many housing bubbles over the past decade in the United Kingdom, United States, Ireland, Spain, and Iceland saw house prices go up 200 and even 500 percent and then lose over half their value in real terms.
The U.S. market has had frequent crashes: 1929, 1962, 1987, 1998, 2000, and 2008. Every time, the bubble was driven by different sectors. In 1929, radio stocks were the Internet stocks of their day. In 1962, the electronic sector crashed. The previous year, most electronic stocks had risen 27 percent, with leading technology stocks like Texas Instruments and Polaroid trading at up a crazy 115 times earnings. In 1987, the S&P had risen more than 40 percent in less than a year and over 60 percent in less than two years. In 1998, it was strong expectation on investment opportunities in Russia that collapsed. In 2000, the Internet bubble was so crazy that companies with no earnings and often no real revenues were able to go public, skyrocket, and then crash. Eventually, in all bubbles fundamental values re-assert themselves and markets crash.
Economists and investors have spilled a lot of ink describing bubbles, yet central bankers and investors never seem to learn and people get caught up in them. Peter Bernstein in Against the Gods states that the evidence "reveals repeated patterns of irrationality, inconsistency, and incompetence in the ways human beings arrive at decisions and choices when faced with uncertainty."
What is extraordinary is how much bubbles all look alike. The situations were similar in many ways. In the 1920s, the financial boom was fueled by new technologies such as the radio that supposedly would change the world. In the 1990s, the stock market rose on the rapid adoption of the Internet. Both technologies were going to fundamentally change the world. Stocks like RCA in the 1920s and Yahoo in the 1990s were darlings that went up like rockets. Figure 9.4 plots the two charts against each other. The similarities and timing of market moves are uncanny.

If you look at Figure 9.5, you can see the gold bubble in the 1970s. (Some academics have noted that the surge in gold prices closely followed the increase in inflation in the late 1970s, reflecting its value as a hedge against inflation. When inflation fell in the 1980s, gold prices followed. So it is an open question whether gold in the 1970s should be considered a bubble.)

Fast-forward 10 years, and you can see from Figure 9.6 that the bubble in the Japanese Nikkei looked almost exactly the same.


Anatomy of Bubbles and Crashes
There is no standard definition of a bubble, but all bubbles look alike because they all go through similar phases. The bible on bubbles is Manias, Panics and Crashes, by Charles Kindleberger. In the book, Kindleberger outlined the five phases of a bubble. He borrowed heavily from the work of the great economist Hyman Minsky. If you look at Figures 9.7 and 9.8 (below), you can see the classic bubble pattern.
(As an aside, all you need to know about the Nobel Prize in Economics is that Minsky, Kindleberger, and Schumpeter did not get one and that Paul Krugman did.)
Stage 1: Displacement
All bubbles start with some basis in reality. Often, it is a new disruptive technology that gets everyone excited, although Kindleberger says it doesn't need to involve technological progress. It could come through a fundamental change in an economy; for example, the opening up of Russia in the 1990s led to the 1998 bubble or in the 2000s interest rates were low and mortgage lenders were able to fund themselves cheaply. In this displacement phase, smart investors notice the changes that are happening and start investing in the industry or country.
Stage 2: Boom
Once a bubble starts, a convincing narrative gains traction and the narrative becomes self-reinforcing. As George Soros observed, fundamental analysis seeks to establish how underlying values are reflected in stock prices, whereas the theory of reflexivity shows how stock prices can influence underlying values. For example, in the 1920s people believed that technology like refrigerators, cars, planes, and the radio would change the world (and they did!). In the 1990s, it was the Internet. One of the keys to any bubble is usually loose credit and lending. To finance all the new consumer goods, in the 1920s installment lending was widely adopted, allowing people to buy more than they would have previously. In the 1990s, Internet companies resorted to vendor financing with cheap money that financial markets were throwing at Internet companies. In the housing boom in the 2000s, rising house prices and looser credit allowed more and more people access to credit. And a new financial innovation called securitization developed in the 1990s as a good way to allocate risk and share good returns was perversely twisted into making subprime mortgages acceptable as safe AAA investments.
Stage 3: Euphoria
In the euphoria phase, everyone becomes aware that they can make money by buying stocks in a certain industry or buying houses in certain places. The early investors have made a lot of money, and, in the words of Kindleberger, "there is nothing so disturbing to one's well-being and judgment as to see a friend get rich." Even people who had been on the sidelines start speculating. Shoeshine boys in the 1920s were buying stocks. In the 1990s, doctors and lawyers were day-trading Internet stocks between appointments. In the subprime boom, dozens of channels had programs about people who became house flippers. At the height of the tech bubble, Internet stocks changed hands three times as frequently as other shares.
The euphoria phase of a bubble tends to be steep but so brief that it gives investors almost no chance get out of their positions. As prices rise exponentially, the lopsided speculation leads to a frantic effort of speculators to all sell at the same time.
We know of one hedge fund in 1999 that had made fortunes for its clients investing in legitimate tech stocks. They decided it was a bubble and elected to close down the fund and return the money in the latter part of 1999. It took a year of concerted effort to close all their positions out. While their investors had fabulous returns, this just illustrates that exiting a bubble can be hard even for professionals. And in illiquid markets? Forget about it.
Stage 4: Crisis
In the crisis phase, the insiders originally involved start to sell. For example, loads of dot-com insiders dumped their stocks while retail investors piled into companies that went bust. In the subprime bubble, CEOs of homebuilding companies, executives of mortgage lenders like Angelo Mozillo, and CEOs of Lehman Brothers like Dick Fuld dumped hundreds of millions of dollars of stock. The selling starts to gain momentum, as speculators realize that they need to sell, too. However, once prices start to fall, the stocks or house prices start to crash. The only way to sell is to offer prices at a much lower level. The bubble bursts, and euphoric buying is replaced by panic selling. The panic selling in a bubble is like the Roadrunner cartoons. The coyote runs over a cliff, keeps running, and suddenly finds that there is nothing under his feet. Crashes are always a reflection of illiquidity in two-sided trading—the inability of sellers to find eager buyers at nearby prices.
Stage 5: Revulsion
Just as prices became wildly out of line during the early stages of a bubble, in the final stage of revulsion, prices overshoot their fundamental values. Where the press used to write only positive stories about the bubble, suddenly journalists uncover fraud, embezzlement, and abuse. Investors who have lost money look for scapegoats and blame others rather than themselves for participating in bubbles. (Who didn't speculate with Internet stocks or houses?) As investors stay away from the bubble, prices can fall to irrationally low levels.




Monday, August 11, 2014

Zebra in a Lion Country

1970s Nifty Fifty were flying high - Indeed very high, take a look at the P/Es Disney's 76, McD 81, Polaroid 97. It doesnot matter forward or trailing, these PEs are ridiculously ridiculous!

"I learned a lesson thats been repeated many times over the years: When a large segment of the market gets overpriced and eventurally corrects, everybody gets nailed" Tech could still nail the rest of the market, Schiller PE being high!

"Market hers, like zebra hers, can't run for long without tiring. I never worry if I am early or late with some trend. Rather than chase the herd, we can wait until it comes back by us again" Dont chase!

In a quiet market after the initial annihilation, volume drops - Cats dont want to sit on a hot or a cold stove:)

At big companies dont talk, just read the transcripts, at small companies speak to the owners!

small good companies compound faster than big good companies

Railroads become docile as road network bloats eg. Penn railroad; Many years out to happen in India

"Dumbo could fly because he was a baby elephant, adult elephants don't drink redbull:)"

How can the stock price of a small company move up:

  • Earnings growth
  • Acquisition - unlikely in the Indian context
  • Repurchase - Duh!
  • Revaluation - Big fish come to prey in the small pond!
"In our experience, there is no reason to worry about non-recognition: sound economic values of small companies get reflected in their stock prices sooner or later", Ben Graham infront of jury, Greenblatt in columbia and now Wagner - Its like the Petronas charm from Harry Porter, valuation always catches up with good companies (young or old)!

read Rolf Banz on Small cap stocks

The later stages of a bull market are like powerful witch coos in our ears, "There is no rick. The market will only go up. Initial public offerings are marvelous. Your stockbroker is your best friend. A limitless, effortless fortune awaits you." In the Narnia story, our heroes managed to fight off the enchantment at the last moment. The witch changed instantly into her true form, a great loathsome serpent. A prince, handily present - he had also been under her spell - kills her with his sword, and all live happily ever after. A bull market has the lulling allure of a lovely, soft-voiced woman, but it, too, can become a loathsome best in an instant. What should you do to foil the market witch in the real world? Once you become aware that you are under a spell, your first reaction is to flee and sell everything. But we know market timing doesn't work. A market may indeed be "overpriced," but it can stay overpriced for years. Bull markets come in all lengths. Your only defense against every sort of market jitters is to think like a long-term investor. If you stare the monster down with focus, patience, and a calm eye, you will be rewarded in the end.







Bubble warning!

The huge cash pile at investing legend Warren Buffett’s holding company Berkshire Hathaway, which crossed the $50 billion mark in June 2014, points simply to one fact about the current market: the scarcity of undervalued securities that could be profitably exploited. The American markets, like many others around the world, have enjoyed a tremendous bull run since 2009. This has largely been due to the flood of cheap money pouring into the markets through the US Federal Reserve that has lowered bond yields (by bidding up their prices), and succeeded in squeezing investors to chase equities and other risky assets—in an attempt to reach for higher yield. 

Be it the cyclically adjusted Shiller PE, level of margin debt, ratio of bears to bull, yield on junk bonds, Fed’s purchases of mortgage bonds, number of IPOs (initial public offerings), leveraged buyouts, or the credit quality of borrowers, all point to an imminent bubble fuelled by credit from the Fed. 

In such a bullish climate, conservative investors are left with the option of either being fully invested in the market and take part in the speculative rally—one hardly warranted by fundamentals—or simply hold cash and wait for the markets to correct and return to sanity. The former offers the thrill of quick profits while exposing the investor to the risk of capital loss, while the latter assures safety of capital and the opportunity to pick up bargains when the market eventually corrects and returns to fundamental value. Buffett, like a truly conservative investor concerned more with the return of capital than return on capital, has chosen the latter course of action. 

This, however, is not the first time Buffett has chosen to pick the unpopular decision of holding cash over staying invested in the market, thus missing one of the most lucrative bull markets in years. In 1969, Buffett closed his investment partnership and returned money to investors citing a market that he found to be fairly valued. In a letter to investors in the partnership, Buffett noted, “The investing environment […] has generally become more negative and frustrating as time has passed […] it seems to me that opportunities for investment that are open to the analyst who stresses quantitative factors have virtually disappeared, after rather steadily drying up over the past twenty years”. That was after delivering magnificent returns to investors, well above the general market, for 13 years beginning 1956.

 Years later, in 1973 and 1974, the Dow Jones Industrial Average sank by over 40%, giving Buffett the opportunity to return to the markets to shop for cheap stocks with cash he held on the sidelines. This led to his investment in winners like The Washington Post, Geico, etc. Buffett, along with his partner Charlie Munger, chose again to remain out of the market between 1984 and 1987 and increase their cash pile before picking Coca Cola shares in 1988.

 The decision to hold cash, let alone for a period of years, is often considered a losing proposition, considering how inflation erodes the real value of cash, and, even more so, when the general market witnesses a historic rally. But in the absence of undervalued securities, unfortunately, that may be the only prudent course of action available to the conservative investor to achieve stable, superior returns in the long run. This is more the case as bonds no longer offer an alternative safe investment. Bond yields have been crushed by the Fed’s intervention in credit markets. Buffett cut down Berkshire’s allocation towards bonds to a decade low, citing low yields. Remember, bond prices can only go down from the current artificially high prices once the Fed’s distortion to the market ends.

 Of course, if one is a “momentum” investor from Wall Street permanently bullish over the prospects of the stock market and confident about timing the markets, this would sound foolish—until markets teach a lesson or two on the impossibility of perfect timing. 

At the moment, Buffett is not the only investing legend cashing out of a market that is overvalued by all measures. Seth Klarman of the Baupost Group, and author of the book Margin of Safety, is another value investor who has chosen to pile up his fund’s cash holdings—representing about half (or even more) of the total value of assets under management. Hedge fund investor Stanley Druckenmiller, with an impressive investment track record of returning 30% annually since 1986 and previously part of George Soros’ Quantum fund, shut operations as early as 2010 citing lack of opportunities in the current bloated market. Legends of the investment world clearly understand the froth in today’s market—one that is totally distorted by the Fed—and hence bailed out early on the market. These conservative investors loading up on cash give themselves the opportunity to take advantage of value bargains when the market eventually faces a painful correction.

Read more at: http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/DKXzoTbEAXWr2qUpKOEj7L/When-the-market-gets-frothy-Warren-Buffett-sits-on-cash.html?utm_source=copy

Sunday, August 10, 2014

Retail blunder

His purchases of shares in Pier 1 Imports and US Airways were poor investments, and he compounded his ill-fated acquisition of Dexter Shoes by using Berkshire shares instead of cash as currency. In fact, Berkshire itself was a poor investment -- Buffett greatly underestimated the capital requirements and competitive pressures endemic to the textile industry.

The only time a “value investment” turns out to be a “value trap” is when you made a mistake in your initial assessment of the company’s value, that is, it was not a “value investment” to begin with. One mistake we made was investing in Pier One Imports, a home furnishing retailer. We misjudged the competitive economics of the business, and incorrectly assumed shoppers would be willing to pay a premium for the shopping experience at Pier 1. Well, it turned out shoppers care about the lowest price, not shopping experience, owing to the commodity nature of the retail business. And in a commodity business, it is the low-cost producer who wins, and a low-cost producer Pier 1 was not. However, since we paid a cheap price for Pier 1, we managed to get out of our position with a minimal loss, despite misjudging the fundamentals of the business.

You follow a metric of buying businesses for “8 to 11 times normalised cash flow”. What is so sacrosanct about 8 to 11 times?
PB: We tried to reverse-engineer most of Buffett’s purchases to find out the multiple of cash flow that he typically pays, and it appears that generally he would pay about 10X. And so we ended up adopting that valuation level as our baseline, and we are willing to adjust it slightly based on the quality and growth profile of the specific business in question.

Thursday, August 7, 2014

Fools

The biggest mistake an investor can make is to develop an ego. Your ego clouds your judgment and slows your thinking. Only fools think they know it all. Investing is a life long education and its teacher is loss.
You cannot learn the real lessons in investing by sitting in a classroom or reading a few books. You have to experience investing by going through every emotional extreme from going broke to making a lot of money. I went broke several times in my early 20’s. Losing all your money either motivates you or you give up. Either way losing money is the best educator there is. After you fight and claw your way out of the hole, you have made it. I had to claw my way out of the hole a few times.

Source: Anand

Wednesday, August 6, 2014

Equally applicable to investing!

Why Do Traders Lose?
If you've been trading for a long time, you no doubt have felt that a monstrous, invisible hand sometimes reaches into your trading account and takes out money. It doesn't seem to matter how many books you buy, how many seminars you attend or how many hours you spend analyzing price charts, you just can't seem to prevent that invisible hand from depleting your trading account funds.
Which brings us to the question: Why do traders lose? Or maybe we should ask, "How do you stop the Hand?" Whether you are a seasoned professional or just thinking about opening your first trading account, the ability to stop the Hand is proportional to how well you understand and overcome the Five Fatal Flaws of trading. For each fatal flaw represents a finger on the invisible hand that wreaks havoc with your trading account.
Fatal Flaw No. 1 -- Lack of Methodology
If you aim to be a consistently successful trader, then you must have a defined trading methodology, which is simply a clear and concise way of looking at markets. Guessing or going by gut instinct won't work over the long run. If you don't have a defined trading methodology, then you don't have a way to know what constitutes a buy or sell signal. Moreover, you can't even consistently correctly identify the trend.
Fatal Flaw No. 2 -- Lack of Discipline
When you have clearly outlined and identified your trading methodology, then you must have the discipline to follow your system. A Lack of Discipline in this regard is the second fatal flaw. If the way you view a price chart or evaluate a potential trade setup is different from how you did it a month ago, then you have either not identified your methodology or you lack the discipline to follow the methodology you have identified. The formula for success is to consistently apply a proven methodology. So the best advice I can give you to overcome a lack of discipline is to define a trading methodology that works best for you and follow it religiously.
Fatal Flaw No. 3 -- Unrealistic Expectations
Between you and me, nothing makes me angrier than those commercials that say something like, "...$5,000 properly positioned in Natural Gas can give you returns of over $40,000..." Advertisements like this are a disservice to the financial industry as a whole and end up costing uneducated investors a lot more than $5,000. In addition, they help to create the third fatal flaw: Unrealistic Expectations.
Yes, it is possible to experience above-average returns trading your own account. However, it's difficult to do it without taking on above-average risk. So what is a realistic return to shoot for in your first year as a trader -- 50%, 100%, 200%? Whoa, let's rein in those unrealistic expectations. In my opinion, the goal for every trader their first year out should be not to lose money. In other words, shoot for a 0% return your first year. If you can manage that, then in year two, try to beat the Dow or the S&P. These goals may not be flashy but they are realistic, and if you can learn to live with them -- and achieve them -- you will fend off the Hand.
Fatal Flaw No. 4 -- Lack of Patience
The fourth finger of the invisible hand that robs your trading account is Lack of Patience. I forget where, but I once read that markets trend only 20% of the time, and, from my experience, I would say that this is an accurate statement. So think about it, the other 80% of the time the markets are not trending in one clear direction.
That may explain why I believe that for any given time frame, there are only two or three really good trading opportunities. For example, if you're a long-term trader, there are typically only two or three compelling tradable moves in a market during any given year. Similarly, if you are a short-term trader, there are only two or three high-quality trade setups in a given week.
All too often, because trading is inherently exciting (and anything involving money usually is exciting), it's easy to feel like you're missing the party if you don't trade a lot. As a result, you start taking trade setups of lesser and lesser quality and begin to over-trade.
How do you overcome this lack of patience? The advice I have found to be most valuable is to remind yourself that every week, there is another trade-of-the-year. In other words, don't worry about missing an opportunity today, because there will be another one tomorrow, next week and next month...I promise.
I remember a line from a movie (either Sergeant York with Gary Cooper or The Patriot with Mel Gibson) in which one character gives advice to another on how to shoot a rifle: "Aim small, miss small." I offer the same advice in this new context. To aim small requires patience. So be patient, and you'll miss small.
Fatal Flaw No. 5 -- Lack of Money Management
The final fatal flaw to overcome as a trader is a Lack of Money Management, and this topic deserves more than just a few paragraphs, because money management encompasses risk/reward analysis, probability of success and failure, protective stops and so much more. Even so, I would like to address the subject of money management with a focus on risk as a function of portfolio size.
Now the big boys (i.e., the professional traders) tend to limit their risk on any given position to 1% - 3% of their portfolio. If we apply this rule to ourselves, then for every $5,000 we have in our trading account, we can risk only $50 - $150 on any given trade. Stocks might be a little different, but a $50 stop in Corn, which is one point, is simply too tight a stop, especially when the 10-day average trading range in Corn recently has been more than 10 points. A more plausible stop might be five points or 10, in which case, depending on what percentage of your total portfolio you want to risk, you would need an account size between $15,000 and $50,000.
Simply put, I believe that many traders begin to trade either under-funded or without sufficient capital in their trading account to trade the markets they choose to trade. And that doesn't even address the size that they trade (i.e., multiple contracts).
To overcome this fatal flaw, let me expand on the logic from the "aim small, miss small" movie line. If you have a small trading account, then trade small. You can accomplish this by trading fewer contracts, or trading e-mini contracts or even stocks. Bottom line, on your way to becoming a consistently successful trader, you must realize that one key is longevity. If your risk on any given position is relatively small, then you can weather the rough spots. Conversely, if you risk 25% of your portfolio on each trade, after four consecutive losers, you're out altogether.
Break the Hand's Grip
Trading successfully is not easy. It's hard work...damn hard. And if anyone leads you to believe otherwise, run the other way, and fast. But this hard work can be rewarding, above-average gains are possible and the sense of satisfaction one feels after a few nice trades is absolutely priceless.
To get to that point, though, you must first break the fingers of the Hand that is holding you back and stealing money from your trading account. I can guarantee that if you attend to the five fatal flaws I've outlined, you won't be caught red-handed stealing from your own account.

Irving Kahn

You say you feel a recovery? Your feelings don’t count. The economy, the market: They don’t care about your feelings. Leave your feelings out of it. Buy the out-of-favor, the unpopular. Nobody can predict the market. Take that premise to heart and look to invest in dollar bills selling for 50¢. If you’re going to do your own research and investing, think value. Think downside risk. Think total return, with dividends tiding you over. We’re in a period of extraordinarily low rates—be careful with fixed income. Stay away from options. Look for securities to hold for three to five years with downside protection. You hope you’re in a recovery, but you don’t know for certain. The recovery could stall. Protect yourself

Tuesday, August 5, 2014

Outsiders CEO - Supreme Industries

http://www.supreme.co.in/video.html

High capital efficiency in plastics business

Hear from 5 minutes on:

  • Need > 25% RoCE efficiency
  • D/E sub 0.6 x
  • Focus away from margins to RoE and RoCE
  • No financial JVs
  • No Equity dilution - infact bought back tons of stock thru 2009