Wednesday, October 22, 2014

Fundamental theorem of Investing:)

Every time you play a hand differently from the way you would have played it if you could see all your
opponents' cards, they gain; and every time you play your hand the same way you would have played it if
you could see all their cards, they lose. Conversely, every time opponents play their hands differently
from the way they would have if they could see all your cards, you gain; and every time they play their hands the same way they would have played if they could see all your cards, you lose.

at the same time, knowing about something is not the same as knowing something:)


Tuesday, October 21, 2014

Shawshank Redemption

Variety called Shawshank “a rough diamond” when it opened, and so the film responded to pressure (repeated viewings) and time (two decades) to ultimately become, if not a cinematic jewel, a global Rorschach test. “I believe part of the reason the movie is so important to people is . . . that in a way it works as a whole for whatever your life is,” says Robbins. “That no matter what your prison is— a bad relationship that you’re slogging through, whether your warden is a terrible boss or a wife or a husband—it holds out the possibility that there is freedom inside you. And that, at some point in life, there is a warm spot on a beach and that we can all get there. But sometimes it takes a while.”

Sensex PE and Returns





Tuesday, October 14, 2014

Sea Change - John Mauldin




Sea Change
By John Mauldin | Oct 13, 2014

u don't need a weatherman

To know which way the wind blows.

– Bob Dylan, "Subterranean Homesick Blues," 1965

Full fathom five thy father lies.
Of his bones are coral made.
Those are pearls that were his eyes.
Nothing of him that doth fade,
But doth suffer a sea-change
Into something rich and strange.

– William Shakespeare, The Tempest

Did you feel the economic weather change this week? The shift was subtle, like fall tippy-toeing in after a pleasant summer to surprise us, but I think we'll look back and say this was the moment when that last grain of sand fell onto the sandpile, triggering many profound fingers of instability in a pile that has long been close to collapse. This is the grain of sand that sets off those long chains of volatility that have been gathering for the last five years, waiting to surprise us with the suddenness and violence of the avalanche they unleash.

I suppose the analogy sprang to mind as I stepped out onto my balcony this morning. Texas has been experiencing one of the most pleasant summers and incredibly wonderful falls in my memory. One of the conversations that seem to occur regularly among locals who have a few decades under their belts here, is just how truly remarkable the weather has been. So it was a bit of a surprise to step out and realize the air had turned brisk. In retrospect it shouldn't have fazed me. The air has been turning brisk in Texas at some point in October for the six decades that my memory covers, and for quite a few additional millennia, I suspect.

But this week, as I worked through my ever-growing mountain of reading, I felt a similar awareness of a change in the economic climate. Like fall, I knew it was coming. In fact, I've been writing about it for years! But just as fall tells us that it's time to get ready for winter, at least in more northerly climes, the portents of the moment suggest to me that it's time to make sure our portfolios are ready for the change in season.

Sea Change

Shakespeare coined the marvelous term sea change in his play The Tempest. Modern-day pundits are liable to apply the word to the relatively minor ebb and flow of events, but Shakespeare meant sea change as a truly transformative event, a metamorphosis of the very nature and substance of a man, by the sea.

In this week's letter we'll talk about the imminent arrival of a true financial sea change, the harbinger of which was some minor commentary this week about the economic climate. This letter is arriving to you a little later this week, as I had quite some difficulty writing it, because, while the signal event is rather easy to discuss, the follow-on consequences are myriad and require more in-depth analysis than I've been able to bring to them on short notice. As I wrestled with what to write, I finally came to realize that this sea change is going to take multiple letters to properly describe. In fact, it might eventually take a book.

So, in a departure from my normal writing style, I am going to offer you a chapter-by-chapter outline for a book. As with all book outlines, it will be simply full of bones but without much meat on them, let alone dressed up with skin and clothing. I will probably even connect the bones in the wrong order and have to go back later and replace a leg bone with a rib, but that is what outlines are for. There is clearly enough content suggested by this outline to carry us through the next several months; and given the importance of the subject, I expect to explore it fully with you. Whether it actually becomes a book, I cannot yet say.

I should note that much of what follows has grown out of in-depth conversations with my associate Worth Wray and our mutual friends. We've become convinced that the imbalances in the global economic system are such that the risks are high that another period of economic volatility like the Great Recession is not only likely but is now in the process of developing. While this time will be different in terms of its causes and symptoms (as all such stressful periods differ from each other in many ways), there will be a rhyme and a rhythm that feels all too familiar. That should actually be good news to most readers, as the last 14 years have taught us a little bit about living through periods of economic volatility. You will get to use those skills you learned the hard way.

This will not be the end of the world if you prepare properly. In fact, there will be plenty of opportunities to take advantage of the coming volatility. If the weatherman tells you winter is coming, is he a prophet of doom? Or is it reasonable counsel that maybe we should get our winter clothes out?

Three caveats before we get started. One, I am often wrong but seldom in doubt. And while I will marshal facts and graphs aplenty to reinforce my arguments, I would encourage you to think through the counterfactuals presented by those who will aggressively disagree.

Two, while it goes without saying, you are responsible for your own decisions. It is easy for me to say that I think the bond market is going to go in a particular direction. I can even bet my personal portfolio on my beliefs. I can't know your circumstances, but if you are similar to most investors, this is the time to make sure you have a truly balanced portfolio with serious risk management in the event of a sudden crisis.

Three, give me (and Worth, whom I am going to draft to write some letters) some time to develop the full range of our ideas. To follow on with my weather analogy, the air is just starting to get crisp, and winter is still a couple months away. Absent something extraordinary, we are not going to get snow and a blizzard in Dallas, Texas, tomorrow. We may still have some time to prepare, but at a minimum it is time to start your preparations. So with those caveats, let's look at an outline for a potential book called Sea Change.

Prologue

I turned publicly bearish on gold in 1986. At the time (a former life in a galaxy far, far away), I was actually writing a newsletter on gold stocks and came to the conclusion that gold was going nowhere – and sold the letter. I was still bearish some 16 years later. Then, on March 1, 2002, I wrote in Thoughts from the Frontline that it was time to turn bullish on gold. Gold at that time was languishing around $300 an ounce, near its all-time bottom.

What drove that call? I thought that the future directions of gold and the dollar were joined at the hip. A bit over a year later I laid out the case for a much weaker dollar in a letter entitled "King Dollar Meets the Guillotine," which later became the basis for a chapter in Bull's Eye Investing. As the chart below shows, the dollar had risen relentlessly through the early Reagan years, doubling in value against the currencies of America's global neighbors, causing exporters to grumble about US dollar policy. Then the bottom fell out, as the dollar made new lows in 1992. From 1992 through 2002 the dollar recovered about half of its value, getting back to roughly where it was in 1967. Elsewhere about that time, I predicted that the euro, which was then at $0.88, would rise to $1.50 before falling back to parity over a very long p eriod of time. I believe we are still on that journey.

One of the biggest drivers of economic fortunes in the global economy is the currency markets. The value of your trading currency affects every aspect of your business and investments. It is fundamental in nature. While most Americans never even see a piece of foreign currency, every time we walk into Walmart, we are subject to the ebb and flow of global currency valuations, as are Europeans and indeed every person who participates in the movement of goods and services around the globe. In fact, globalization means that currency values are more important than ever. The world is more tightly interconnected now than it has ever been, which means that events which previously had no effect upon global affairs can trigger cascades of events that affect everyone.

I believe we are in the early stages of a profound currency-valuation sea change. I have lived through five major changes in the value of the dollar in the 45 years since Nixon closed the gold window. And while we are used to 40% to 50% moves in the stock market and other commodity prices happening in just a few years (or less), large movements in major trading currencies typically take many years, if not decades, to develop. I believe we are in the opening act of a multi-year US dollar bull market.

Chapter 1 – The Boys Who Cry Wolf

We all know the story of the boy who cried "Wolf!" once too often. I have been pounding the table about a dollar bull market for about three years now. I see eyes roll when I speak at conferences around the world and boldly forecast that the dollar is going to get stronger than anyone in the room can possibly fathom. All the signs have been pointing to it, and indeed we've seen the dollar move upward in a rather herky-jerky fashion off the lows of 2010, but not in a way that has been all that dramatic (except, arguably, against the Japanese yen). Indeed, the relative trading range of the dollar has been relatively constrained over the past six to seven years, pivoting around 80 on the DXY (symbol for the US dollar spot index).

This is in contrast to the true doom-and-gloomers, who are forecasting "the Demise of the Dollar." At the same time, they are calling for an unseemly rise in interest rates, and many of them believe the Federal Reserve will push us over the brink into hyperinflation. Needless to say, then, you should buy massive amounts of gold and get your money out of the country.

I have had long conversations with many who believe in such a scenario. I call some of them close friends, even if we disagree on something as fundamental as the future of the dollar. I've come to the conclusion that their conviction is a lot like a religious belief.  I'm not going to change them, and so I make very little effort to try. So, fair and friendly warning: if you think the US dollar is headed to oblivion, you are not going to like this book outline or the next few months of my letter.

(Sidebar to those of you who, like me, own gold. You do not have to be a dollar bear to be constructive on gold and believe that it belongs in a diversified portfolio. But more on that front if we do a chapter on gold.)

Getting back to portents of winter, this week saw two side comments by Federal Reserve members that put a distinct chill in the air.

The first is from William Dudley, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and a permanent voting member on the FOMC. In a speech at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, he pushed back on the idea that it is time to raise rates. While acknowledging the relatively positive stance of the Federal Reserve in its forecast, he said:

While I believe that the risks around this consensus forecast are reasonably well balanced, I also believe that the likelihood that growth will be substantially stronger than the point forecast is probably relatively low. [my emphasis]

He went on to cite weaker than expected consumer spending and the expectation that consumer durable purchases will be weaker in the future (by which I assume he means automobiles, which have been on a blistering, back-to-the-all-time-high pace due to supereasy credit, much of it subprime and with durations beyond five years.) He faults mortgage lenders for the substandard housing recovery, as if the last massacre of lenders was not enough to scar their collective psyche for decades.

(Sadly, he might have a point. Somewhat humorously, Ben Bernanke tells us he was turned down for a mortgage because his income is somewhat unsteady. He did not fit the "check-the-box" protocol of his local mortgage lender. I sympathize. I was turned down multiple times earlier this year before finding willing lenders who actually competed for my business. My business life does not accord with a standard check-the-box mortgage. I read about another business owner who noted that any of his 300 employees could get a mortgage, but he could not because his income was not stable enough. Go figure.)

Each of Dudley's points was covered in long paragraphs. And then he delivered a short, throwaway line that caught my attention. He cited the growth in the exchange value of the dollar over the last few months as a reason for downside risk. Really? Go back and look at the chart above and see the relatively minor dollar moves of the past few months. Why should dollar strength show up in a list of reasons for upcoming weakness in the US economy?

The next day saw the release of the minutes of the previous month's FOMC meeting. In the part labeled "Staff Review of the Financial Situation," the staff mentioned "… responding in part to disappointing economic data abroad, the US dollar appreciated against most currencies over the inter-meeting period, including large appreciations against the euro, the yen, and the pound sterling."

While there are precedents for the staff review to mention the dollar, it doesn't happen often. (In January 2002 the staff notes included concern about the strength of the dollar. That concern went away rather quickly. Coincidence? Hat tip, Joan McCullough.) The strengthening dollar is clearly on the minds of the members and staff of the Federal Reserve. Hmmm…

The key here is to note that the strength of the dollar (or lack of it) is not traditionally a Federal Reserve concern. The relative value of the dollar is the purview of the US Treasury, while the Federal Reserve is responsible for maintaining stable purchasing power (interest rates and money supply, etc.). Both organizations are careful not to tread on the other's territory.

What if we are at the beginning of another 10-year bull market in the dollar? Is it unthinkable that the value of the dollar could rise back to 120 on the index over that time? Let's look at that chart again:

From a very long-term perspective, 100 on that index is certainly a possibility, and 120 is not without precedent. But if the dollar rises to those levels, even in the very short-term, volatile patterns of the past, it changes everything it touches. And the value of the dollar touches everything. So let's think about some of the consequences over the long term of a rising dollar.

Chapter 2 – A Monkey Wrench for the Fed

A rising dollar is almighty inconvenient for a Federal Reserve that would like to eventually raise interest rates. Multiple regional Fed presidents and Fed governors would really like to see inflation in the 2% range prior to raising rates.

A dollar that is rising against the currencies of our major trading partners is inherently disinflationary, if not outright deflationary. (Pay attention to how often that word deflation occurs in this outline.) The current inflation rate is 1.7%. The Dallas trimmed-mean PCE inflation rate was actually negative in August and has been falling for the last five months, more or less coinciding with the rising dollar.

The makeup of the Federal Reserve FOMC voting membership next year is going to be decidedly "dovish." Dallas Fed President Richard Fisher will retire, and his voice will no longer be present. Yellen and the entire team (with two notable exceptions) have been out and about using the words data-dependent, with Minneapolis Fed President Kocherlakota arguing that raising rates anytime in 2015 would be a mistake.

Look at what Federal Reserve unemployment and inflation-rate predictions are as of September 17:

Fourteen of the 17 members of the Fed (including the 12 regional presidents) anticipate that rates will be raised in 2015.  Most observers think the first rate increase will happen at the June meeting.

What happens if unemployment continues to fall toward 5.5% and inflation drops below 1.5%? Can this Fed – not you or I, but the aggressively Keynesian members sitting on that board – justify raising rates if inflation is only 1.5% and falling? Which is the more important data number, unemployment or inflation? Or do they both need to click into place?

If the dollar were to continue to rise and thus allow Europe and Japan to export their deflation to the US, it is not clear that the Fed would raise rates in June.

A rise in the dollar from its current 85 on the DXY to 120 over the next six or seven years will throw a monkey wrench into the plans of the Federal Reserve.

Chapter 3 – Every Central Bank for Itself

A rising dollar presents all sorts of problems and opportunities for the central banks of the world. Japan has chosen the most aggressive monetary policy in the history of the world and will, I believe, work to see the value of the yen cut in half over time. Notice in the chart below that it was only 20 years ago that the yen was at 250. It touched 150 less than eight years ago. Forty years ago it was at 357. Is it so unthinkable that the yen could retrace half that move? Not to the Japanese. That would take it into the range of 200 to the dollar. I made the case for such a move in Endgame and doubled down on the prospects for Japan in Code Red. Japan is a bug in search of a windshield. The yen is embarked on a multi-year decline.

Europe would clearly like to see a weaker euro against the dollar and other major trading currencies. Ditto for almost every central bank in the world. But a rising dollar creates special problems for China and some emerging markets, problems we will look at in later chapters.

In an important speech on Saturday, October 11, Fed Vice-Chairman Stan Fischer outlined the mechanisms for the international transmission of monetary policy. Fischer says the international effects of monetary policy "spill back" onto the US, and the central bank cannot make "sensible" choices without taking them into account.

[T]he U.S. economy and the economies of the rest of the world have important feedback effects on each other. To make coherent policy choices, we have to take these feedback effects into account.

He ended with an assurance to all that the Federal Reserve would provide liquidity to the world in the event of another crisis. Because it is in our interest, he says. This will be the ultimate test of game theory, where it might take years to find the Nash equilibrium.

The bottom line? It's every central bank for itself. No matter how much pleading there is from peripheral central banks, there will be no true coordination among the major central banks. (Hat tip to David Kotok for alerting me to Fischer's speech as I was writing. He also pointed out that the unintended consequences of the feedback effect means that policymaking can be dangerous.)

Chapter 4 – The Man Behind the Euro Curtain

Was it only a few years ago that Mario Draghi uttered his famous line, "We will do whatever it takes"? Interest rates in Europe have collapsed since then, as the European bond markets believed that Mario had their back. He has not had to do anything of true significance to back up those words, and what he has done has been lackluster.

This week Mario was up on the stage in Washington DC, where he essentially said that the problems in Europe cannot be fixed by monetary policy but are fiscal and regulatory and require actions from governments, not from central banks. The Bundesbank has clearly held sway, at least so far as the prospects for European quantitative easing go. While Draghi hinted that he would like to do €1 trillion worth of QE, it is not clear exactly how he would go about that.

Mario is like the Wizard of Oz. He talks a good game and puts on a good show, but it is soon going to become apparent that he really doesn't have any magic, at least not until the Germans allow him to open up his trunk of tricks. Right now they're keeping it safely stowed away in Berlin.

German intransigence is going to precipitate a crisis in Europe. Italy has been in a recession. France is crossing into one. Spain is barely holding on. Even German exports are slowing. France and Italy are balking at meeting the 3% deficit targets mandated by the EU treaty. Germany has drawn a line in the sand; France and Italy fully intend to cross it. This should be interesting; but however it turns out, I don't think it will be good for the euro.

How long can interest rates in Europe stay at the irrationally low levels where they are today? We touched on that question in past letters, so I won't cover that ground again, other than to say negative interest rates in Ireland and France are as indicative of dysfunctional markets as anything one might postulate.

When Draghi loses the narrative, or his ability to simply jawbone the market to where he would like it to be, all hell is going to break loose in the European bond market. Exactly what will the safe-haven currency be? The Swiss can't print enough francs. Even Norway doesn't have that many kroner. It will be the US dollar. Implications in a later chapter.

Chapter 5 – The Wrong Side of the Trade

Close to 50% of sales and profits for the S&P 500 come from outside the US. A strong dollar will put a strain on those dollar-denominated profits. Not an insurmountable problem, as Japanese businesses have figured out how to thrive in a rising-yen environment for decades. But old US business dogs are going to have to learn new tricks in a rising-dollar world.

But a strong dollar is not just a problem for US exporters. It is particularly a problem for countries that are financed by the dollar carry trade. Multiple trillions of dollars have left the US courtesy of quantitative easing and have ended up financing all manner of trades and investments around the world. As long as the dollar is neutral or falling, that's a good thing for dollar carry-trade investors.

If you are a Chinese businessman and you can borrow dollars (which you certainly can) and you believe that your government is going to make the yuan stronger over time, you will be able to pay back cheaper dollars and make the difference on the carry (the difference between what US bonds pay and returns that can be earned in China). But what happens if the yuan begins to fall? That trade unwinds swiftly and negatively. And it unwinds at a time that is particularly inconvenient for China. Flood the market with too much money, and inflation becomes a problem. (The Chinese are in a different phase of the monetary cycle than the US is, so the problems are not the same.)

It is not just China. Those dollars have filtered into every nook and cranny of the world; and now, if those trades are unwound, investors and most specifically hedge funds are going to have to buy dollars to unwind their trades. That will force the dollar ever higher against various currencies; and while any one currency is not significant enough to create a structural difference that can impact global trade, together they will have a significant effect.

There is a crisis brewing in emerging markets. Most of the world's hedge funds and investors are on the wrong side of the dollar trade. Unwinding that trade is going to be a bitch (that is a technical economics term). Worth Wray will be writing about that very topic in a few weeks. You do not want to miss that letter.

Chapter 6 – The Texas Carry Trade

A rising dollar is going to put pressure on oil prices in particular and on energy prices in general. And falling oil prices have a strong secondary effect on Federal Reserve interest-rate policy. Pay attention, there will be a quiz.

Over at The National Interest, Sam Rines of Chilton Capital writes that Texas has been the engine of growth for the US for the past five years:

Job creation might be a good place to start. Texas has created jobs – there is little arguing that point. For instance, we know the U.S. economy only recently gained back the jobs lost in the Great Recession. This is not true of Texas. While the United States dropped about 6 percent of employment, Texas lost 4 percent and recovered them all by August 2011 – nearly three years before the United States as a whole.

Here is where the numbers get interesting. From its peak in January 2008 through today, the United States has created only 750,000 jobs. Texas created over a million jobs during that same period – meaning that the rest of the country (RotC) is still short 300,000 jobs. During the recovery, job creation has been all Texas or – at the very least – disproportionately Texas.

Choosing a different starting point – for example, in the trough of job losses – changes the extremity of the story. And there are all sorts of reasons for this disparity between Texas and the rest of the country, most of which miss the main point. In a conversation with Worth, Rines called the disparity the Texas Carry Trade. I like that.

The Texas story is by and large an oil story. We are far more diversified that we were in the '80s, but oil is clearly the driver. Texas has been at the forefront of job creation because our borders happen to contain the mostly inhospitable scrubland known as the Permian Basin in West Texas, not to mention the coastal plays and those in East Texas. Much (not all) of the growth in oil has come from horizontal drilling and fracking. And while there are enormous amounts of energy in Texas, it is not necessarily cheap energy – not like it was in the "good old days."

Seventy-dollar oil considerably restrains the enthusiasm of Texas oil companies, let alone the banks and individuals that finance them.

And it is not just Texas companies. The Marcellus play in the Northeast is responsible for hundreds of thousands of jobs. And it's much the same story all over the US. Oil has been a significant portion of the growth of US GDP for the past five years. If you take the massive oil boom away, the US looks a lot like Europe in terms of growth and job creation. Which is to say, anemic.

Seventy-dollar oil starts to show up in the unemployment rate, which makes it more difficult for the Federal Reserve to raise rates.

I was talking with Joe Goyne, president of Pegasus Bank in Dallas. He is one of those entrepreneurial bankers who actually analyzes a loan personally rather than letting some computer determine whether it fits the criteria. (The country would be better off with a lot more Joes running the banking industry, but that's another story.) Joe's customers are a who's who of Dallas. We were discussing my convictions about a strong dollar and what that would do to the price of oil. Joe offered, "You won't believe the pain in Dallas if oil falls to $60." We went on to discuss some details. Does $60 oil sound far-fetched? Joe and I both remember $15 oil. Texas has been through numerous oil busts. The running joke in the late '80s was "Would the last person leaving Houston please turn out the lights?"

The late '80s was an ugly time for Texas. Will the Saudis ever allow oil to dip below $60 again? Can they afford to cut their production that much? What will happen to Russia if Brent drops to $80, let alone $60? It's not just Texas. And while the world might benefit from lower energy prices, they would create havoc in a few key regions. And throw another monkey wrench in Federal Reserve policy. And in terms of the oil price, gods forbid that peace breaks out in the Middle East. But, sadly, given current circumstances, it doesn't look like we have to worry about that.

Chapter 7 – The Bond Bull Comes Stampeding Back

Many of us in the US look at Europe and wonder how interest rates can fall to such insane levels. And the answer is that bond markets have rationales all their own. The unwinding of carry trades means the demand for dollars will rise just as the Federal Reserve cuts off the spigot. Some people look at Japan's flooding the market with yen as an antidote and hope that the ECB, too, will soon start printing; but that is not going to reduce the demand for dollars to unwind the carry trade.

Whatever Japan and Europe do, the growth of global liquidity is still likely to fall over the next few years; and that is an inherently deflationary event, especially in dollar terms.

In addition, when – not if – there is a renewed crisis in Europe, the flight to safety is going to put pressure on the dollar and further downward pressure on US interest rates. While it is not altogether certain that China will have a major crisis – although reasonable economic historians would suggest that is the probable case – if it happens it will put further upward pressure on the dollar as a safe-haven currency. God forbid those two events – crises in Europe and China – happen at the same time. Our necks would snap at the severity of the acceleration in the value of the dollar. The convergent crises would also trigger a global recession.

We're going to see a return of the bond bull market with a vengeance. Almost the entire world has hedged its bets for a rising interest-rate environment and assumes a benign dollar market. Almost no one expects a falling interest-rate environment, yet that is precisely what we will get if the dollar continues to rise and we have a crisis or two.

Chapter 8 – The Third Leg of the Secular Bear Market

I was writing about secular bear markets in 1999. I was early to the party, as usual (although my friends will note that I'm often late to real-time, real-life parties). I noted in Bull's Eye Investing that it typically takes three events to completely wash out a trend. We have had two significant corrections since April 2000, accompanied by two recessions. I think the next recession will give us that final third leg of the secular bear market, hard on the heels of another correction that tests (but maybe doesn't quite touch) the lows of 2009.

At that point I will trade my secular bear beret for a snappy new secular bull Panama. And while we may see a significant correction out of the current volatility, I don't think the final dénouement of the secular bear will come without a global recession.

Since most of you have been through this before, you can probably figure out what strategy you should choose; but I would suggest at least thinking about having some type of hedge/moving average/risk-dispersion strategy in your toolkit.

The point is to get through this next crucial phase with as much of your capital intact as possible, in order to be able to take advantage of the coming secular bull market, when it will be anchors aweigh. Remember, we always get through these things. It is almost never the end of the world, and betting on the end of the world is a losing proposition anyway. Specifics to come later (maddening, I know, but there are space limits).

Chapter 9 – Commodities in a Dollar Bull Market

This book outline is running a little long, but a quick word on commodities. In general, commodity prices are going to face downward pressure, at least in dollar terms. That includes copper, most of the base metals, oil, etc. Silver has clearly been in a very ugly bear market. I would continue to accumulate insurance gold, but I would invest in gold only in terms of yen or another depreciating currency. Bear in mind that precious metals – along with other commodities – can and will fall precipitously in the event of a deflationary shock… although the inflationary effects of an aggressive central bank response may ultimately drive the yellow metal far above its current price.

Chapter 10 – The Return of Volatility

The final chapter and conclusion pretty much end as you would expect: the demise of monetary policy's ability to soothe the soul of the markets and the return of volatility. We hopefully get a full-fledged restructuring of the sovereign debt markets. The Fed and sister central banks will try the same tired tools they have been using. Except they have already been to the zero rate boundary and have wasted the opportunity they had to increase rates so that they could lower them later. Another round of quantitative easing? Quite possible if we get a true deflation scare or a global recession. But I don't think it will have the same results. The unintended consequences and the unknown spillovers will only increase eventual volatility.

For new readers, I invite you to read my books (co-authored with Jonathan Tepper) Endgame and Code Red. They pretty much lay out the background you need in order to understand what will be happening in the future. We are seeing the end of the debt supercycle and the beginning of currency wars. We'll experience the throes of hyper-indebted nation-states trying to survive what they will see as irrational attacks by a bond market. "How can you not have faith in the government? We are doing our best to try to make everything work out just fine. As long as you cooperate." Which bond markets have a nasty habit of not doing. Oh, you can placate them in the short term, but ultimately they want to be paid back in risk-adjusted buying power. And that is the one currency that many nation-states will no longer have. Now without major reforms and a significant restructuring of the social order.

A final thought. Businesses will keep on doing what they do, in spite of the machinations of governments and monetary authorities. Entrepreneurs will adjust. New inventions will be made. Over the medium term, life on earth will get better. I honestly do see a return of the secular bull market and a pretty cool third decade, an updated version of the Roaring Twenties. Only this time there will be no need for speakeasies. I fully intend to be around to enjoy it and am looking forward to being relatively optimistic about the future. I really don't get much personal pleasure from writing these Debbie Downer letters. But my role is to not think about the world as it should be or as I want it to be, but to be as right as I can about the direction we are going. The ride could just be a little bumpier in the short term of the next few years. Fasten your seatbelts.

And for those of you looking for specific advice, let me point you to Jared Dillian, the new editor of my own Bull's Eye Investor service. He has been finding ways to trade and invest in this market. Last Friday he wrote:

Guys, the price action has been bad for a while. And it is getting worse. The market is demonstrating repeatedly that it can't hold its gains. In my 15 years of doing this, I've only seen worse price action twice: 2000, and 2007.

You can read about Jared and appreciate his baleful glare of a photo right here. Want to sit on a trading desk across from him? I want him on MY side of the table. See if you might want him in your corner as well.

Chicago, Athens (Texas), Boston, Geneva, and Atlanta

I have one more week to enjoy Dallas, and then I'm back on the road. I will go to Chicago for a speech, fly back to a meeting with Kyle Bass and his friends at the Barefoot Ranch in Athens, Texas, and then fly out to Boston to spend the weekend with Niall Ferguson and some of his friends at his annual briefing. I am sure I will be happily surfing mental stimulus overload that week. I fly from Boston to Geneva for a few days and then more or less directly to Atlanta for a day (board meeting), before heading back to Dallas.

Next Saturday is wedding day. It has been years since I've been to a wedding, and next Saturday I will go to two. I fly to Houston to watch my young associate, Mr. Worth Wray, tie the knot with his lovely fiancée, Adrienne. You have to admire a young man for playing above his weight class. He gets married in the morning, and that afternoon we fly back to Dallas to attend the wedding of David Tice's daughter Abigail.

Next Monday evening I get to spend some time with Woody Brock here in Dallas before I launch my travels. I'll be back in time for Halloween.

It's time to hit the send button. I smell stir-fry chicken and vegetables simmering on the stove and need to find a piece of mindless entertainment with which to relax with family and friends. Have a great week,

Your ready to find his sweaters analyst,

John Mauldin
John Mauldin
subscribers@MauldinEconomics.com

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Wednesday, October 8, 2014

Pabrai's ISB speech Summary - Source: Anish

On my gravestone I hope they write that "He was a cloner" - Mohnish Pabrai

Below is a summary of talks that Mohnish Pabrai gave at ISB and MDI in Dec 2013. For those who are not familiar with him - Mohnish is a classic value investor in the tradition of Warren Buffett, Charlie Munger and Seth Klarman. He currently manages an approx $500 mn fund which is highly concentrated. And also has a bedroom in his office where he naps when he gets tired of reading or cloning.

Mohnish started Pabrai Funds in 1999 with $ 1mn which had his own $100,000. From 1999-2007 he compounded at 37% p.a. and 29% p.a. after fees. Before that from 1994-1999 $ 1mn compounded at 44% p.a (before fees). After 2007 compounded at -47.5% . Last 4 and half years compounding at 25.8% a year. He says he still has 11.5 years to go to compound at 26% a year. The reason he wants to compound at 26% p.a. is because that rate of compounding doubles equity in 3 yrs and turns a million dollars into a BILLION dollars in 30 years. He talks about that by narrating the parable of how the game of chess was invented to illustrate the power of compounding. Buffett was on the 18th square on the chess board when he first heard of him. He had compounded at 26% approx for the last 31 years.

Strategy

Charlie Munger once told him that a good investment operation can be built by focusing on 
  • Cannibalization (Buyback of shares)
  • Cloning (Aping successful investors)
  • Spin offs (De-mergers)
What stuck in his mind was the cloning part and he went about putting that in action with single minded focus. In Swami Vivekananda's words - Take a simple idea and take it seriously.

Cloning Warren Buffett's (WB) portfolio. 
If an investor had just followed WB when he bought a stock and publicly disclosed it and bought it at the highest price that day, and sold it when he did and publicly disclosed it , that portfolio would have beaten the S&P by 11% say Gerald Martin (American University) and John Puthenpurackal (University of Nevada). Also contrary to popular belief, they found that Berkshire Hathaway invests primarily in large-cap growth rather than "value" stocks. Here is the link to the paper - Imitation is the Sincerest Form of Flattery: Warren Buffett and Berkshire Hathaway. 

(Another interesting paper is on the way Buffett uses leverage - Buffett's Alpha). 

How is WB's portfolio replicable ? if its so simple why does no one do it. He says that it took him a long time to come up with this insight. There is something strange in the human genome that makes humans very averse to being copy cats. most humans do not consider cloning as they think of it as beneath themselves. Microsoft (most of their revenues comes from windows and office which were cloned or bought) is not even a great cloner but they are big. Sam Walton was not a high IQ person. Walmart for the first 20 years did not come up with innovation. They just copied K-Mart and Sears. Burger King just opens up where McDonald's opens up. It has worked very well for them.

Fascinating insight on Auction Markets Vs Negotiated Markets
By nature auction driven markets which have faceless buyers and faceless sellers, are set up for distortion. If WB were to just invest in private cos he would have not been able to beat the market. Negotiated markets have a informed buyer and seller and deals happen over protracted negotiation. This results in lesser distortions. 

(And this I think is what is happening in the Indian PE industry today. An Indian promoter knows very well that there is too much money chasing too few good deals even now after a number of PE funds have left or are going slow. Also perhaps explains that fact why a number of PE funds like Chrycap , Multiples, Sequoia, WestBridge to name a few are doing PIPE deals rather than private investments.)


Circle of Competence
Figure out the business and buy it at less than intrinsic value. 98% of the time you are not going to understand the business and it better to keep away from those businesses which you dont understand. Its ok to have a small circle of competence and still do very well as investing. Gave example of a developer and RE investor who invests only within 2 sq miles of San Francisco.

Buffett is a multi dimensional investor and does lots of other deals which are not just moat based deals. He also does a lot of arbitrage deals. So obviously, he does not blindly replicate what Buffett does, but he uses that as a high level filter and looks for opportunities which fall within his circle of competence. Also a number of opportunities like the GS and GE deals made during 2008 were exclusive to WB and would not be available to anyone else.

The Checklist 
In the great crash of 2008, his portfolio got decimated and had a huge drawdown. Compounded at negative 47% almost a year and half - 2008 and 2009. He attributes this to hubris as he didn't have negative returns even in 2000 during the dotcom crash. He says that he completely missed the housing bubble.

He then drew upon the idea of a checklist from a NYT article and read The Checklist Manifesto by Dr Atul Gawande. Got the idea from the aviation industry where checklists were used to lower the number of human errors. He studied his own investing errors and asked the question as to were there factors which were clearly visible before the investment was made. In most cases where the investment went bad, he found that the factors were visible. He looked at his own portfolio as well the portfolio of investors like WB etc. and studied their mistakes and if these mistakes were identifiable at the time the investment was made. He then came up with his check list which has about 97 questions.

Checklist focuses on 
  • Leverage: one of the mistakes in 2007 was buying a high quality mortgage lender but the co was highly leveraged. Do not buy a business which is dependent on the kindness of strangers. 
  • Debt covenants
  • Moats
  • Union and Labor relations
  • Pre-investment talk with a peer fund manager (also got this from Munger)
  • Management and Ownership
    • How much stock do they own
    • Do they act like owners
    • Track record of promoters




He also had had a 21 month period where a number of investments went to zero. Post implementing this checklist his Max PERMANENT CAPITAL LOSS has been below 1% of investment - $ 5 mn.

He also does not go meeting management or kicking the tires approach. His view is that managements in US are much more transparent and honest than Indian management and have much longer operating history. So if he was focusing on Indian businesses, he would look at potential of becoming 10x-20x in the next 10 years. But even then if he was investing a large sum, then he would need to be more active and move to India. (post that though he has recently picked up a stake in South Indian Bank. )



Portfolio strategy since 2009
  • 1st 75% of cash - 2-3 x in 2-3 years
  • Next 10% - min 3x in 2-3 years
  • Next 5% - min 4x in 2-3 years
  • Next 5% - min 5x in 2-3 years
  • Last 5% - more than 5 x in 2-3 years
Make lesser decisions. Take out sized bets. Also the last 10% usually stays in cash because of this portfolio construct strategy. 


How to go about screening stocks?
Become a shameless clone. Make a list of investors you admire and who have done well and make a list of their investments. 

Portfolio construct
Munger feels 4 large stocks are enough. However, one can build portfolio from 10-12 large stocks. Don't focus on all industries and sectors. Buy full position at one go. No need to stagger. Too much diversification is a hedge for ignorance. In bad times (2008, 1929, 1987) the correlation goes to one and the diversification does not help.


Why do super investors invest alone and dont have a large team?
Even a 10 member team cannot evaluate more than a few hundred public companies every year. There are about 50,000 companies listed globally. The investment manager will end up taking shortcuts with or without a team as the data set is too large. Hence having a large team , where ultimately the decision is made by the fund manager is not different from a small team with the same fund manager. Other reasons could be differing circles of competence, large motors are not good at grinding away without result-less action. There is a natural bias for action. Also how do you compensate anyone who generate zero ideas. [Ask the MF and PE guys in India. :-) ]

Resources
Gurufocus.com, valueinvestors.com, sumzero.com, corner of berkshire and fairfax, the manual of ideas, edgar online, graham and doddsville (news letter of Columbia Business School), ibillionaire.com and dataroma.com & oid.com 

However the single most quality is patience. John Templeton said that the best analyst will not be right more than 2 out of 3 times. No one can escape a loss. 

Exit criteria
Write down your exit criteria before you enter. It should fit in 5-6 sentences. Basically price should be above intrinsic value. Evaluate intrinsic value every 3-6 months and not every day or week as businesses go through ups and downs. If a share you bought at $10 and you thought the intrinsic value is $40 at the time of entry. Say it goes to $ 40 in 2 years and you reevaluate that the business is now worth $ 60 then hold. If you think the intrinsic value is lower then you no longer hold and you sell. 

There is another one which he gave at Columbia university. Will blog on that next week.

Link to the ISB talk:

Sunday, October 5, 2014

Guy Spier



https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ifDCmRBElPY

Business Adventures - John Brooks

 Mr. Market is Fickle
No one knows apriori when the market is going to crumble; even Mandelbrot's power law states that degree of correction can be guessed not the timing with reasonable probability - It seems straight from Taleb's fooled by Randomness or the other way round - We can't predict when complex systems will suddenly crumble but ex-post (i.e. after the event); everyone reasons out the event and fool themselves into easily available attribution (Simon's bounded rationality)

 Insiders drink kool-aid
GM launches Edsel based on extensive research and a huge research, media and marketing spend ($ 250MM in 1950s) - After much initial fanfare, the launch becomes a major failure because key men believed in their own cool-aid than objectively reading what market was telling them - two conclusions, insiders are vulnerable and every one wants to see data and logic the way they want to see it. corollary: don't depend on company's rosy or bleak picture about the future - Only margin of safety counts

Tech obsolescence in 60s - Xerox case
Seemed eerily similar to blackberry, only difference being company built considerable IP which was milked by Apple and Microsoft; Gates in his notes says that he encouraged MSFT employees to look beyond their bread and butter business or Google spending 20 percent of the time on new initiatives

----------------------------
Gates summary below

ON JULY 12, 2014

Not long after I first met Warren Buffett back in 1991, I asked him to recommend his favorite book about business. He didn’t miss a beat: “It’s Business Adventures, by John Brooks,” he said. “I’ll send you my copy.” I was intrigued: I had never heard of Business Adventures or John Brooks.
Today, more than two decades after Warren lent it to me—and more than four decades after it was first published—Business Adventures remains the best business book I’ve ever read. John Brooks is still my favorite business writer. (And Warren, if you’re reading this, I still have your copy.)
A skeptic might wonder how this out-of-print collection of New Yorker articles from the 1960s could have anything to say about business today. After all, in 1966, when Brooks profiled Xerox, the company’s top-of-the-line copier weighed 650 pounds, cost $27,500, required a full-time operator, and came with a fire extinguisher because of its tendency to overheat. A lot has changed since then.
It’s certainly true that many of the particulars of business have changed. But the fundamentals have not. Brooks’s deeper insights about business are just as relevant today as they were back then. In terms of its longevity, Business Adventures stands alongside Benjamin Graham’s The Intelligent Investor, the 1949 book that Warren says is the best book on investing that he has ever read.
Brooks grew up in New Jersey during the Depression, attended Princeton University (where he roomed with future Secretary of State George Shultz), and, after serving in World War II, turned to journalism with dreams of becoming a novelist. In addition to his magazine work, he published a handful of books, only some of which are still in print. He died in 1993.
As the journalist Michael Lewis wrote in his foreword to Brooks’s book The Go-Go Years, even when Brooks got things wrong, “at least he got them wrong in an interesting way.” Unlike a lot of today’s business writers, Brooks didn’t boil his work down into pat how-to lessons or simplistic explanations for success. (How many times have you read that some company is taking off because they give their employees free lunch?) You won’t find any listicles in his work. Brooks wrote long articles that frame an issue, explore it in depth, introduce a few compelling characters, and show how things went for them.
In one called “The Impacted Philosophers,” he uses a case of price-fixing at General Electric to explore miscommunication—sometimes intentional miscommunication—up and down the corporate ladder. It was, he writes, “a breakdown in intramural communication so drastic as to make the building of the Tower of Babel seem a triumph of organizational rapport.”
In “The Fate of the Edsel,” he refutes the popular explanations for why Ford’s flagship car was such a historic flop. It wasn’t because the car was overly poll-tested; it was because Ford’s executives only pretended to be acting on what the polls said. “Although the Edsel was supposed to be advertised, and otherwise promoted, strictly on the basis of preferences expressed in polls, some old-fashioned snake-oil selling methods, intuitive rather than scientific, crept in.” It certainly didn’t help that the first Edsels “were delivered with oil leaks, sticking hoods, trunks that wouldn’t open, and push buttons that…couldn’t be budged with a hammer.”
One of Brooks’s most instructive stories is “Xerox Xerox Xerox Xerox.” (The headline alone belongs in the Journalism Hall of Fame.) The example of Xerox is one that everyone in the tech industry should study. Starting in the early ’70s, the company funded a huge amount of R&D that wasn’t directly related to copiers, including research that led to Ethernet networks and the first graphical user interface (the look you know today as Windows or OS X).
But because Xerox executives didn’t think these ideas fit their core business, they chose not to turn them into marketable products. Others stepped in and went to market with products based on the research that Xerox had done. Both Apple and Microsoft, for example, drew on Xerox’s work on graphical user interfaces.
I know I’m not alone in seeing this decision as a mistake on Xerox’s part. I was certainly determined to avoid it at Microsoft. I pushed hard to make sure that we kept thinking big about the opportunities created by our research in areas like computer vision and speech recognition. Many other journalists have written about Xerox, but Brooks’s article tells an important part of the company’s early story. He shows how it was built on original, outside-the-box thinking, which makes it all the more surprising that as Xerox matured, it would miss out on unconventional ideas developed by its own researchers.
Brooks was also a masterful storyteller. He could craft a page-turner like “The Last Great Corner,” about the man who founded the Piggly Wiggly grocery chain and his attempt to foil investors intent on shorting his company’s stock. I couldn’t wait to see how things turned out for him. (Here’s a spoiler: Not well.) Other times you can almost hear Brooks chuckling as he tells some absurd story. There’s a passage in “The Fate of the Edsel” in which a PR man for Ford organizes a fashion show for the wives of newspaper reporters. The host of the fashion show turns out to be a female impersonator, which might seem edgy today but would have been scandalous for a major American corporation in 1957. Brooks notes that the reporters’ wives “were able to give their husbands an extra paragraph or two for their stories.”
Brooks’s work is a great reminder that the rules for running a strong business and creating value haven’t changed. For one thing, there’s an essential human factor in every business endeavor. It doesn’t matter if you have a perfect product, production plan, and marketing pitch; you’ll still need the right people to lead and implement those plans.
That is a lesson you learn quickly in business, and I’ve been reminded of it at every step of my career, first at Microsoft and now at the foundation. Which people are you going to back? Do their roles fit their abilities? Do they have both the IQ and EQ to succeed? Warren is famous for this approach at Berkshire Hathaway, where he buys great businesses run by wonderful managers and then gets out of the way.
Business Adventures is as much about the strengths and weaknesses of leaders in challenging circumstances as it is about the particulars of one business or another. In that sense, it is still relevant not despite its age but because of it. John Brooks’s work is really about human nature, which is why it has stood the test of time.

Saturday, October 4, 2014

4 filters

- Can I understand it? If it passes this filter,
- Does it look like it has some kind of sustainable competitive advantage? If it passes this filter,
- Is the management composed of able and honest people? If it passes this filter,
- Is the price right? If it passes this filter, then we write a check

Friday, October 3, 2014

when to buy - buffett

http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=3000316538

Berkshire purchased the shares for $1.699 billion, and Buffett has always had a "buy and hold" mentality to investing. This guiding principle has led Berkshire to be prosperous for the past four decades.
"I'm going to make mistakes, but I'm not going to make a mistake because I like to buy businesses I like as they go down in price. I'm just going to be wrong about the facts," Buffett said