Food for thought
- Company has very powerful brands in the crayons/water paints/ink/pens etc. But is this translating to either pricing power or defensibility of revenues/margins? The answer seems no.
Just taking a look at the financials for the last 10 years -
- The company 3 or 4 loss making years; Cumulative FCF is -ve => has always funded through raising incremental resources
- capital efficiency is volatile with a downward bias at best
- The company could not pass on the raw material hikes - which are linked to crude derivatives; tells me the underlying industry should be highly fragmented and price sensitive;
All these said, can the company turnaround given the new Japanese promoter? may be
- Will start exporting but will it change the fundamental nature of the business - are there world class companies in the crayon/educational crafts business? don't know
- Numbers have started looking good in the first quarter, the rights issue should help
But do we like the fundamental nature of the business?
In Buffett's words - "Both our operating and investment experience cause us to conclude that “turnarounds” seldom turn, and that the same energies and talent are much better employed in a good business purchased at a fair price than in a poor business purchased at a bargain price"
I hope for Kokuyo's sake the business turns around not just P&L wise but as a strong franchise or it will be yet another casualty for a Japanese Strategic Investor in India. And as I am only "hoping" I would stay away from such businesses!
- Company has very powerful brands in the crayons/water paints/ink/pens etc. But is this translating to either pricing power or defensibility of revenues/margins? The answer seems no.
Just taking a look at the financials for the last 10 years -
- The company 3 or 4 loss making years; Cumulative FCF is -ve => has always funded through raising incremental resources
- capital efficiency is volatile with a downward bias at best
- The company could not pass on the raw material hikes - which are linked to crude derivatives; tells me the underlying industry should be highly fragmented and price sensitive;
All these said, can the company turnaround given the new Japanese promoter? may be
- Will start exporting but will it change the fundamental nature of the business - are there world class companies in the crayon/educational crafts business? don't know
- Numbers have started looking good in the first quarter, the rights issue should help
But do we like the fundamental nature of the business?
In Buffett's words - "Both our operating and investment experience cause us to conclude that “turnarounds” seldom turn, and that the same energies and talent are much better employed in a good business purchased at a fair price than in a poor business purchased at a bargain price"
I hope for Kokuyo's sake the business turns around not just P&L wise but as a strong franchise or it will be yet another casualty for a Japanese Strategic Investor in India. And as I am only "hoping" I would stay away from such businesses!
Consolidated | 200403 | 200503 | 200603 | 200703 | 200803 | 200903 | 201003 | 201103 | 201203 | 201303 | |
Net Sales | 183.1 | 198.5 | 196.9 | 187.7 | 213.8 | 283.5 | 330.7 | 358.3 | 383.9 | 435.9 | |
Total Income | 184.1 | 199.4 | 197.7 | 189.3 | 214.4 | 283.9 | 331.3 | 358.3 | 386.2 | 436.6 | |
Total Expenditure | 171.7 | 196.5 | 187.8 | 181.6 | 201.5 | 264.7 | 303.7 | 331.4 | 370.3 | 440.3 | |
PBIDT | 12.4 | 2.9 | 9.9 | 7.7 | 12.9 | 19.2 | 27.6 | 26.9 | 15.9 | -3.6 | |
PBIT | 8.1 | -1.7 | 4.7 | 49.2 | 9.1 | 14.8 | 22.4 | 19.4 | 9.5 | -11.3 | |
PBT | 3.1 | -7.3 | -1.7 | 45.7 | 6.5 | 9.6 | 16.6 | 12.1 | 1.6 | -18.8 | |
PAT | 1.9 | -4.9 | -1.5 | 36.1 | 3.8 | 6.1 | 12 | 8.6 | 1.3 | -13.4 | |
Cash Profit | 6.3 | -0.3 | 3.7 | 39.9 | 7.6 | 10.5 | 17.2 | 15.1 | 8.3 | -5.8 | |
Sources of Funds | |||||||||||
Equity Paid Up | 4.8 | 4.8 | 4.8 | 4.8 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6.1 | 6.9 | 6.9 | |
Reserves and Surplus | 17 | 12.1 | 10.5 | 21.1 | 42.7 | 47.5 | 56.4 | 64.6 | 125 | 111.6 | |
Net Worth | 19.4 | 7 | 7 | 20.9 | 45.3 | 51.8 | 62.4 | 70.8 | 131.9 | 118.5 | |
Total Debt | 43 | 49.7 | 59.8 | 15.3 | 20.4 | 39.4 | 42.6 | 43.6 | 41.6 | 65.2 | |
Application of Funds | |||||||||||
Gross Block | 61.1 | 70.5 | 75.8 | 43.1 | 50.2 | 78.3 | 89.9 | 104.4 | 110.3 | 121.9 | |
Investments | 0.6 | 0.6 | 1.1 | 1 | 1 | 0.8 | 1.3 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 2.2 | |
Cash and Bank balance | 2.2 | 2.6 | 1.9 | 2.4 | 3.6 | 2.4 | 2 | 1.3 | 14.5 | 14 | |
Net Current Assets | 33 | 18.7 | 20.1 | 16 | 38.9 | 43.3 | 47.9 | 8.6 | 62.5 | 54.6 | |
Total Current Liabilities | 44.8 | 54.3 | 60.3 | 42.8 | 38 | 49.3 | 73.9 | 112.6 | 114.9 | 130.5 | |
Total Assets | 114.1 | 122.7 | 136.5 | 84.4 | 107.4 | 143.3 | 180.5 | 196.1 | 256.2 | 270.1 | |
Cash Flow | |||||||||||
Cash Flow from Operations | 2.6 | 10.9 | 9 | -13.8 | -10.8 | 12.4 | 18.6 | 23.8 | -27.3 | -3.8 | |
Cash Flow from Investing activities | -6.3 | -10.2 | -13.2 | 40.6 | -10.3 | -25.9 | -14.9 | -16.8 | -8.9 | -13.6 | |
Cash Flow from Finance activities | 3.8 | -0.2 | 3.4 | -26.3 | 22.3 | 12.2 | -4 | -7.7 | 49.7 | 17 | |
FCF | -3.7 | 0.7 | -4.2 | 26.8 | -21.1 | -13.5 | 3.7 | 7 | -36.2 | -17.4 | |
Ratios | |||||||||||
No. of Shares | 0.48 | 0.48 | 0.48 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.61 | 0.69 | 0.69 | ||
Market Capitalization | 29.8 | 32.2 | 61.2 | 58.5 | 109.4 | 50.5 | 151.8 | 323.3 | 237.4 | 213 | |
Price | 67.1 | 127.5 | 121.9 | 182.3 | 84.2 | 253.0 | 530.0 | 344.1 | 308.7 | ||
Margins | |||||||||||
EBITDA | 7% | 1% | 5% | 4% | 6% | 7% | 8% | 8% | 4% | -1% | |
PAT | 1% | -3% | -1% | 20% | 2% | 3% | 7% | 5% | 1% | -7% | |
Returns | |||||||||||
RoE | #N/A | -37% | -21% | 259% | 11% | 13% | 21% | 13% | 1% | -11% | |
ROCE | 1% | 4% | 37% | 7% | 9% | 11% | 9% | 4% | -2% | ||
Multiples | |||||||||||
P/E | (6.6) | (40.8) | 1.6 | 28.8 | 8.3 | 12.7 | 37.6 | 182.6 | (15.9) | ||
EV/EBITDA | 28.2 | 12.2 | 9.6 | 10.1 | 4.7 | 7.0 | 13.6 | 17.5 | -77.3 |
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